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ABSTRACT 
Prior studies have shown that the majority of FfSE 350 firms do not fully comply 
with the Code of Corporate Governance (henceforth known as the Code). This is 
puzzling since the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has advocated the benefits 
of having high corporate governance standards and yet it would seem that not 
many firms are taking this initiative seriously. Therefore I am motivated to find 
reasons why most of the firms still decided not to take this kind of opportunity to 
inform their shareholders that they are working in tandem with the principles of 
the Code and would rather following their own measures or standards of good 
governance. In order to address this, I will investigate what makes the firms that 
fully comply with the Code differ from than those that do not in term of 
safeguarding the welfare of stakeholders and controlling managers' behaviour, 
what set of principles within the Code matter most to the shareholders, and what 
are the potential costs to the firms if they do not fully comply with the Code. I 
found that firms that claim full compliance with the Code gave higher 
compensation to CEOs and lesser disclosure on long term compensation plan. I 
also discover that firms that comply with the important principles in the Code 
have lower analyst bias and larger analyst following. There is also some evidence 
that firms are trying to mask their underperformance by claiming full compliance 
with the Code in their annual report. I also find that firms that have a low 
compliance rate with the Code will attract higher negative news than firms that 
fully comply with the Code. This suggests that there is more than merely claiming 
full compliance with the Code in the annual report and regulators need to rethink 
their direction in term of formulating more relevant guidance or principles III 
promoting better governance among firms. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Prior studies (Padgett & Shabbir, 2005; Grant Thornton, 2006) have shown that 
the majority of FTSE 350 firms do not fully comply with the Code of Corporate 
Governance (henceforth known as the Code). This is puzzling since the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) has advocated the benefits of having high corporate 
governance standards and yet not many fIrms are taking this initiative seriously. 
Therefore I am motivated to find reasons why most of the firms still decide not to 
take this kind of opportunity to inform their shareholders that they are working in 
tandem with the principles of the Code and would rather follow their own 
measures or standards of good governance. In order to address this, I will 
investigate: 
1) what makes the firms that fully comply with the Code differs than those 
that do not in term of safeguarding the welfare of stakeholders and 
controlling managers' behaviour, 
2) what set of principles within the Code matter most to the shareholders, and 
3) what are the potential costs to the firms if they do not fully comply with 
the Code. 
My research will be designed to understand whether there are such benefits 
derived from the decision to fully comply with the Code. If there are indeed 
positive relationships between compliance to the Code and maintaining the 
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welfare of stakeholders and controlling the managers' behaviour, then this will 
raise concerns on why the majority of the firms still do not comply. If the link is 
in the form of a negative relationship, this will imply that there is no or little 
incremental benefit associated with full compliance to the Code. This suggests 
that regulators need to rethink their direction in term of formulating more relevant 
guidance or principles in promoting good governance among firms. This can be 
done by identifying which principles within the Code hold greater importance to 
the shareholders and this is the intention of this study. 
I am also motivated to investigate the potential costs to the firm when they decide 
not to comply with certain principles or requirements of the Code. To measure 
this potential cost, I will use media criticism (which includes reaction by 
shareholders, investors, journalists and the general public) to determine the 
importance or the peril of not complying with certain requirements of the Code. 
In recent years, the discussion on corporate governance has become prominent 
since the occurrence of a series of public scandals involving high profile public 
companies like Enron and World Com among others. There is a perceived need to 
redefine accounting standards and tighten the existing regulations and acts. The 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) has revised its accounting 
standards to reflect more accurately the demand for more relevant information by 
stakeholders of the companyl. Over the years, regulators in countries have been 
1 In April 2001, the IASB adopted International Accounting Standards (lAS) and developing 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in an effort towards international 
harmonization. 
13 
trying to improve corporate governance through their own regulatory board by 
producing codes or best practice of corporate governance 2. A study by Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) has shown that these initiatives have appeared to have 
generally improved the governance of countries that have adopted those. 
One of the earliest forms of a corporate governance code was introduced in the 
United Kingdom (UK). The Cadbury Code (Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance) was introduced on 1st December 1992 after several high profile 
scandals such as Polly Peck International in 1990 and the BCCI and Robert 
Maxwell scandals in 1991. It is mentioned among the reasons for setting up the 
Cadbury Report (p.ll) that: 
'Companies whose standards of corporate governance are high are the more 
likely to gain the confidence of investors and support for the development of 
their businesses'. 
This implies that firms that comply with the Cadbury Report and the subsequent 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance will be favoured by investors and thus 
could safeguard the interest of the stakeholders. This is especially crucial during 
the latest UK financial crisis in late 2008 where it is important to have good 
governance to establish trust and this is echoed by Thyil & Young (2009) study 
where better disclosure to explain variations to the application of the main 
principles of the Code is among the main concerns of the shareholders. 
2 Out of 63 countries that already have code or best practises of corporate governance, 15 have 
revised it in 2006,12 in 2007,16 in 2008 and 5 in 2009 (up to September) 
(http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php) 
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One particularly interesting aspect of the Code in the UK is that it is based on the 
"comply or explain" principle. Basically, a firm will have to confirm that it 
complies with the Code's provisions or, where it does not, provide the 
explanations. The rationale behind this is mentioned in the Cadbury Report (p.lO) 
that: 
"The effectiveness with which boards discharge their responsibilities 
determines Britain's competitive position. They must be free to drive their 
companies forward, but exercise that freedom within a framework of 
effective accountability. This is the essence of any system of good 
corporate governance." 
Even though compliance is not compulsory, firms that do comply with the Code 
will project an image of being good in governance and its benefits have been 
extolled by various concerned groups. For example, in 2006, during the launch of 
"City of London - City of Learning" initiative by the Lord Mayor of London, the 
FRC published a brief publication explaining the UK approach to corporate 
governance and what are the advantages and benefits of them. They quoted 
studies by FTSE ISS Corporate Governance Index, Governance Metrics 
International and National Association of Pension Funds that confirmed the UK as 
a leading country in terms of governance standards. Governance Metrics 
International further argued in their website that: 
"Firms that emphasise corporate governance and transparency will, over 
time, generate superior returns and economic performance and lower their 
cost of capital." 
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Thus, compliance to the Code is seen as a measure of good governance and 
benefits the firm by higher share returns and financial performance. 
However, this is certainly not reflected in the actual rate of compliance to the 
Code. According to Annual Corporate Governance Review 2004 which is 
published by Pensions Investment Research Consultants3, only 34 per cent of 
FfSE All Share companies are fully compliant with the Code. This is further 
confirmed by the Grant Thornton FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review 
(2006) which suggests that the fully compliant rate is around 34.1 per cent for the 
FfSE 350 companies4. The high rate of non-compliance among the firms begs the 
question on what are the bases for their decision whether to comply or not with 
the Code. Prior studies have tried to find explanation or motivation behind this 
phenomenon and they outlined several reasons. 
The first possibility is that firms that do not comply do have fundamental 
governance weaknesses. It means that compliance can be regarded as a good 
indicator for good governance, as has been shown by Padgett & Shabbir (2005). 
Another possibility is that firms are selecting their own set of principles from the 
Code and, possibly other governance measurements not in the Code. This means 
that not all principles in the Code are in the same level of priority in determining 
good governance of the firm because some are nothing more than superficial and 
3 Pensions Investment Research Consultants is a UK-based independent research and advisory 
consultancy providing services to institutional investors on corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility. 
4 In 2004 it managed to achieve 57.8% compliance but halved in 2005 (27.5% compliance) due to 
the impact of the revised Combined Code of Corporate Governance. FfSE 100 companies tend to 
have a slightly higher percentage of compliance; 42.9%(2006),41 %(2005),62.6%(2004). 
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adherence to them will not necessarily greatly elevate the status of good 
governance for the firms. Previous studies confirmed that the level of importance 
of each principle in the Code is different by selecting only a few of them as the 
proxy for good governance6. 
Even so, firms that do fully comply will usually produce a statement in their 
annual report to indicate this achievement. For example, AstraZeneca PLC in their 
2006 Directors' Report (pg. 75) stated that: 
"The Company is applying all the main and supporting principles of good 
governance in the Combined Code. The Company is complying with all of 
the provisions of the Combined Code." 
This type of statement should give a strong signal to stakeholders that the firm is 
doing their best in term of governance compared to other firms that do not fully 
comply with the Code. 
Under agency theory, if managers' objectives are not aligned with the firms, they 
will find any opportune moment to serve their own interest before the firms and 
the welfare of the stakeholders. They will indulge in various activities that are 
detrimental to the firm in the short and long term such as value reducing 
diversification, rewarding themselves with higher compensation, wasting finn's 
5 For example, Grant Thornton (2006) find that only 55.4% of the FTSE 350 firms disclosed the 
terms and conditions of appointment of non-executive directors are available for inspection, which 
forms part of the compliance index, it is doubtful whether it can be interpreted as a reliable 
measurement for good governance. 
6 MacNeil & Li (2005) have 11 factors in their study whilst Padgett & Shabbir (2005) have 12 
factors. Arcot & Bruno (2007) only use 8 factors taken from the Code as indicators for good 
governance. 
17 
resources like cash and manipulate earnings. They will also keep the stakeholders 
from scrutinizing their action in details by resorting to low quality of disclosure 
and will make sure they retain their position even if the firm is performing badly. 
Prior studies (Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1997; Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999; 
Beekes & Brown, 2006; Core, Guay & Rusticus, 2006) have looked into these 
issues and link them with one or two measurements of good governance but never 
in reference to the compliance to the Code in the UK. Other prior studies in the 
UK have only considered the link between compliance to the Code with firm's 
performance (Padgett and Shabbir, 2005; MacNeil & Li, 2006; Arcot & Bruno, 
2007). Therefore, there is a massive literature gap regarding the need to see the 
link between firms that comply with the Code and how they are safeguarding the 
welfare of stakeholders and controlling managers' behaviour. 
Prior studies have also examined into the impact of non-compliance on firm 
performance (Padgett and Shabbir, 2005; MacNeil & Li, 2006; Arcot & Bruno, 
2007) but none so far have considered the effect of non-compliance on other 
factors such as media criticism. Current studies on the effect of media criticism on 
executive compensation plans (Core, Guay & Larcker, 2008) and board 
ineffectiveness (Joe, Louis & Robinson, 2007) do not look on the specific 
requirements of the Code. So there is a knowledge gap in this area of interaction 
of media with corporate governance. 
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In this study I extend the earlier works by Denis et al. (1997), Core et al. (1999), 
Beekes, Pope & Young (2004), Beekes & Brown (2006), Huson, Malatesta & 
Parrino (2004), Conyon, Mallin & Sadler (2002), Core et al. (2006) and Tetlock 
(2007) by using alternative measurements of corporate governance, which is the 
structured compliance rate obtained from Grant Thornton. The study is based on a 
sample of FTSE 350 fIrms from 2003 until 2007. I also obtained various financial 
data from Datastream and FAME, governance and compensation data from 
Manifest, forecasted EPS from 1/B/E/S7 and share ownership data from the 
Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbooks. I then tested nine hypotheses and 
constructed models to represent them which are then analysed by employing 
ordinary least square, logistic and two-stage least squares regression depending on 
the type of variables measured. 
I found that firms that claim full compliance with the Code gave higher 
compensation to CEO and lesser disclosure on long term compensation plan. I 
also discover that firms that comply with the important principles in the Code 
have lower analyst bias and larger analyst following. There is no evidence of 
relationship between firms that comply with the Code and level of diversification, 
timeliness of earnings and CEO turnover. There is also some evidence that firms 
are trying to mask their underperformance by claiming full compliance with the 
Code in their annual report. I found that firms that have low compliance rate with 
7 I/B/E/S is the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System database, currently owned by Thomson 
Reuters 
R Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbook is a yearly publication by Caritas.Data and available in 
most major libraries in the UK 
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the main principles of the Code will attract higher negative news than firms that 
fully comply with the Code. 
The contributions of this study are as follows. First, the results provide insights on 
the alternative measurements of corporate governance, which is by looking into 
the structured compliance rate of the Code provided by an independent body. This 
fills an existing gap especially in the UK study where prior studies devised their 
own index of compliance which could hamper comparability. Second, the study 
sheds light on what benefits and drawbacks associated with firms that claim to 
fully comply with the Code and firms that actually comply with the important 
principles within the Code. Third, the study explores the alternative possible ways 
to look into the potential costs of compliance with the Code through media 
criticism. 
Key limitations of my work are as follows. First, my study uses a sample of FTSE 
350 firms from 2003 until 2007. Due to various merging, delisting and takeover 
activities among others, including the missing data, the final sample can be 
smaller than expected and might limit the generalisation that I made. Second, 
various changes based on other prior studies could be incorporated on the models, 
proxies and indices used in this study. There is still more room for improvement 
and improvisation by including more alternative research design by other and 
recent studies. Third, there still exists ambiguity when it comes to defining 
governance, or in this case, identifying which principles of the Code constitutes 
good governance. However, the recent availability of compliance data and future 
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research could help to produce a better governance measures involving the 
principles of the Code to be used especially in the UK study. 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. The next chapter (Chapter Two) 
describes corporate governance in detail and the development of the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance. 
Chapter Three reviews the compliance with the Code in the UK and its 
relationship with various issues related to managerial decision making. 
Chapter Four is an empirical study that looks into the relationship between 
compliance with the Code and several issues related to the welfare of the 
stakeholders. Chapter Four also studies the interaction between compliance with 
the Code and firm performance. 
Chapter Five investigates the relation between compliance with the Code and 
media criticism. 
Finally, the main conclusions of this thesis are presented in Chapter Six. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.1 Introduction on Corporate Governance in the UK 
Corporate governance is the 'system by which companies are directed and 
controlled' (Cadbury, 1992). Corporate governance also includes relationships 
between the firm and its stakeholders and also how to achieve a long-term success 
and build up its reputation by taking into consideration of other factors such as 
legal, regulatory, institutional environment, macroeconomic policies, degree of 
competition, environmental and societal interests of the communities (OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004). 
Most of the issues on corporate governance gained prominence in the UK after the 
publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992. After this several other reports were 
issued through the next decade, such as Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel Report 
(1998), Turnbull Report (1999) and Higgs Report (2003). In addition, the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance was firstly introduced in May 2000 by 
the Committee on Corporate Governance, which subsequently underwent various 
improvements in 2003, 2006 and 2008 under the responsibilities of the Financial 
Reporting Council. 
This chapter will examine all of these reports and the Codes to discuss the issues 
addressed under each publication and therefore the direction and future of 
corporate governance in the UK. 
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2.2 Reports on Corporate Governance 
2.2.1 CADBURY REPORT 
Sir Adrian Cadbury, a former Chairman of Cadbury and Cadbury Schweppes was 
invited to chair the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
which was formed in 1991. After eighteen months, the Report of the Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (or better known as the 
Cadbury Report) was produced in December 1992 and was a response to 
'continuing concerns about standards of financial reporting and accountability, 
heightened by BCC], Maxwell and the controversy over directors' pay, which has 
kept corporate governance in the public eye (Preface of the Report)'. 
The Report generated lots of interest and discussions among the business 
community, particularly regarding various recommendations (deemed 
controversial) during that time. Several of these important recommendations are 
detailed below: 
1) The CEO and Chairman ofcompanies should be separated 
The Report is in opinion that given the importance and particular nature of 
the chairman's role, it should in principle be separate from that of the chief 
executive (Para. 4.9). Therefore the Report recommended that there should 
be a division of responsibilities between these two positions, such that no 
particular individual will have unlimited power to make decisions. 
However, if the firm decides that the chairman and the CEO will be the 
same person, the Report urged that there should be a strong and 
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independent element on the board, although they are silent on how to 
create that element on the board. 
2) Board of directors should have at least three non-executive directors 
The Report recommended that there was a need to have more non-
executive directors on a board to ensure that their views will carry 
significant weight in the board's decisions (Para 4.11). In addition, the 
Report suggested that two of the three non-executive directors should have 
no financial or personal ties to executives. 
3) Audit committee 
The Report recommended that all listed firms should establish an audit 
committee with a minimum of three members. The committee membership 
should be confined to the non-executive directors and the majority of these 
non-executives should be independent (Para 4.35). The committee would 
be given written terms of reference and must meet at least twice a year, 
together with the external auditor and the finance director. The committee 
should also have a discussion with the external auditors without executive 
board members present, to ensure that there are no unresolved issues of 
concern. 
4) Directors' responsibilities 
The Report recommended that a brief statement of directors' 
responsibilities for the accounts should appear in the report and accounts, 
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as a counterpart to a statement by the auditors about their reporting 
responsibilities (Para 4.28). 
5) Nomination committee 
The Report suggested that a nomination committee to be set up, consisting 
of a majority of non-executive directors on it and be chaired either by the 
chairman or a non-executive director (Para 4.30). 
6) Internal controls 
The Report referred to s.221 of the Companies Act 1985 on the 
responsibilities of the directors in maintaining adequate accounting 
records. To meet these responsibilities directors need in practice to 
maintain a system of internal control over the financial management of the 
company, including procedures designed to minimize the risk of fraud 
(Para 4.32). Since an effective internal control system is a key aspect of 
the efficient management of a company, the Report recommend that the 
directors should make a statement in the report and accounts on the 
effectiveness of their system of internal control. 
7) Board remuneration 
The Report recommended that in disclosing directors' total emoluments, 
separate figures should be given for their salary and performance-related 
elements and that the criteria on which performance is measured should be 
explained. Relevant information about stock options, stock appreciation 
rights, and pension contributions should also be given (Para 4.40). In 
25 
addition, the Report suggested that directors can only extend their service 
for more than three years if they receive shareholders' approval. 
8) Remuneration committee 
The Report also recommend that the boards should appoint remuneration 
committees, consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive directors and 
chaired by a non-executive director, to recommend to the board the 
remuneration of the executive directors in all its forms, drawing on outside 
advice as necessary (Para 4.42). The Report insisted that executive 
directors should play no part in decisions on their own remuneration and 
the membership of the remuneration committee should appear in the 
Directors' Report. 
In 1994, the principles recommended under the Cadbury Report were appended to 
the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange. Although it is not necessary for 
the firms to comply with the principles, they have to explain to the stock market 
why they did not comply with them. 
2.2.2 GREENBURY REPORT 
The UK started the privatisation of the public utilities since the early 1980s under 
the Conservatives government. However, by the early 1990s the public have 
expressed their anger over spiraling executive pay of the directors of these 
privatized utilities. Therefore another committee was promptly set up in 1995 and 
was chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, a chairman of Marks & Spencer. This 
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committee was tasked to review the existing principles in the Cadbury Code and 
to focus specifically on the executive compensation. 
The recommendations made by the Greenbury Report was published in July 1995 
and focused mainly on the remuneration committee, remuneration disclosure and 
approval provisions, remuneration policy and service contracts and compensation. 
Among the salient points are shown below: 
1) A remuneration committee must consist exclusively of non-executive 
directors with no personal financial interest other than as shareholders in 
the matters to be decided (Para A4). 
2) The report by the remuneration committee must include full details of all 
elements in the remuneration package of each individual director by name, 
such as basic salary, benefits in kind, annual bonuses and long-term 
incentive schemes including share options (Para B4). 
3) The remuneration committee should judge where to position their firm 
relative to other firms. They should be aware what other comparable firms 
are paying and should take account of relative performance (Para C2). 
4) The remuneration committees should consider what compensation 
commitments their directors' contracts of service, if any, would entail in 
the event of early termination, particularly for unsatisfactory performance 
(Para Dl). 
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The Report also makes suggestions that all listed firms in the UK should comply 
with the Code to the fullest extent practicable and to disclose their compliance 
statement in the annual report. In addition, the Report also requested that the 
London Stock Exchange should introduce continuing obligations for the listed 
firms to implement the Code's provisions. 
2.2.3 HAMPEL REPORT 
Both Cadbury and Greenbury Reports recommended that a new committee should 
review the implementation of their findings. Therefore another committee was set 
up in 1998 and it was chaired by a chairman of ICI pIc, Sir Ronald Hampel. This 
committee suggested that a set of principles and code is established, to include all 
the works that have been done by Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports. The 
committee also suggested that the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) should keep 
under review the possible need in the future for further studies and revisions of the 
Code on corporate governance. 
Among the recommendations produced by the Report are to recommend 
institutional investors to vote the shares under their control but the voting should 
not be compulsory, and to continue with the unitary structure of the board, in 
contrast with a two tier framework currently practice in other European countries 
like Germany. 
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2.2.4 TURNBULL REPORT 
The following year saw another report produced by the committee chaired by 
Nigel Turnbull of the Rank Group, pIc. This report recommended directors to be 
responsible for internal financial and auditing controls. It requires directors to 
exercise judgement in reviewing how the firm has implemented the requirements 
of the Code relating to internal control and reporting to shareholders thereon. 
The Report basically highlighted the importance of internal control and risk 
management by stressing that a firm's system of internal control has a key role in 
the management of risks that are significant to the fulfillment of its business 
objectives (Para 10). Effective financial controls will facilitates the effectiveness 
and efficiency of operations, help ensure the reliability of internal and external 
reporting and assists compliance with laws and regulations (Para 11). 
2.2.5 HIGGS REPORT 
When the Combined Code was due for revisions in 2003, the UK government 
commissioned Sir Derek Higgs to chair another committee to review the role and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors. Many of its recommendations for the 
listed firms have been implemented in the revised Combined Code. Some of the 
recommendations made under this Report are as below: 
1) The Code should provide that at least half of the members of the board, 
excluding the chairman, should be independent non-executive directors. 
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2) A chief executive should not become chairman of the same company. 
3) A senior independent director should be identified and be available to 
shareholders, if they have concerns that have not been resolved through 
the normal channels of contact with the chairman or chief executive. 
4) No one non-executive director should sit on all three principal board 
committees (audit, nomination and remuneration) simultaneously. 
2.3 Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
Based upon the discussion in the previous section, it can clearly be seen that the 
Code is essentially a consolidation and refinement of a number of different reports 
and codes concerning opinions on good corporate governance. Since 2000, there 
have been four Codes published by the committee on corporate governance and 
FRC, and they are detailed below. 
2.3.1 THE COMBINED CODE: PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
AND CODE OF BEST PRACTICE (2000) 
This Code was derived by the Committee on Corporate Governance from the 
Committee's Final Report and from the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports. It has 
two sections; Companies and Institutional Shareholders. Under Companies 
section, several sub-sections were listed such as Directors, Directors' 
Remuneration, Relations with Shareholders and Accountability and Audit. The 
principles outlined in the Code can be seen in Table 2.1. In addition the Code also 
provides Schedule A which talks about the Provisions on the Design of 
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Performance Related Remuneration and Schedule B which discusses on the 
Provisions on what should be included in the Remuneration Report. 
2.3.2 THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003) 
This is the first Code issued by FRC and it supersedes and replaces the Code 
issued by Hampel Report in 1998. The Code contains main and supporting 
principles and provisions. At that time, all listed firms are required to make a 
disclosure statement in two parts in relation to the Code. In the first part of the 
statement, the firm has to report on how it applies the principles in the Code. In 
the second part of the statement the firm has either to confirm that it complies 
with the Code's provisions or where it does not, to provide an explanation. 
This Code has similar section arrangement with the previous one but includes 
additional Schedules to outline the guidance on liability of non-executive directors 
in term of care, skill and diligence. A second Schedule talks about disclosure of 
corporate governance arrangements. In addition, this Code includes several other 
guidance and good practice suggestions from Turnbull, Smith (which focuses on 
guidance for audit committees) and Higgs Reports. 
2.3.3 THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006) 
This Code has a similar setup with the previous one in term of contents outlay. It 
supersedes and replaces the previous Code following a review by the FRC of the 
implementation of the Code in 2005 and subsequent consultations on possible 
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amendments to the Code. Only several minor changes were made and 
incorporated into the new Code such as an amendment to the: 
1) provision B.2.1, to allow the chairman to sit on the remuneration 
committee where he or she was considered independent at the time of 
appointment, 
2) section D.2, to provide shareholders voting by proxy with the option of 
withholding their vote, and to require the publication of details of proxies 
lodged at the AGM where votes are taken on a show of hands, and 
3) for those provisions that require firms to make information available 
(provisions A.4.1, B.2.1 and C.3.3), to enable the requirement to be met by 
placing the information on the company's website. 
2.3.4 THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2008) 
This Code supersedes the previous Code and by now the structure of the Code has 
stabilized and remains the same. In this version, several more minor changes were 
implemented based upon the review and comments from the respondents to the 
review. Some of the changes include removing the restriction on an individual 
chairing more than one FfSE 100 firm and for listed firms outside the FfSE 350, 
the firm chairman is allowed to be a member of, but not chair, the audit committee 
provided he or she was considered independent on appointment. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
In November 2006, FRC published a document titled 'The UK Approach to 
Corporate Governance'. Basically, the document emphasises the 
'need to have good corporate governance to ensure the effective 
operation of a free market, which enables wealth creation and 
freedom from poverty (page. I)'. 
It highlighted the UK approach in regulating business, based upon principles 
rather than rules based, as it reduces the cost of introducing law and detailed 
regulations that might constrain business practice and innovation. With its 
relatively low associated costs, the Code encourages good governance practices, 
and at the same time allows flexibility to the firms to adopt a different approach if 
that is more appropriate to their circumstances. In the end, the effectiveness of the 
firm's governance practices should benefit the shareholders of the firm. That is 
why under the concept of 'comply or explain', the firm can choose to adopt a 
different approach if that is more appropriate to their circumstances with 
explanations to their shareholders, who must then decide whether they are content 
with the approach that has been taken. 
Business environment always changing and the Code will undergo its regular 
revisions and amendments every few years in order for it to become relevant to 
the need of the stakeholders of the firms. Even so, no one can deny that the 
introduction of the Code has influenced not just how the firms are behaving 
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towards their shareholders in the UK, but the impact has influenced majority of 
the countries in the world. Every year many countries has adopted a similar 
guidelines of good practices that mirrors the Code which affirms the effectiveness 
of principles based over rules based. 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE AND ISSUES RELATED TO 
MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 
3.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the relationship between compliance with the Code and 
issues related to managerial decision making such as diversification, CEO 
compensation and accounting quality. Earlier studies have investigated various 
corporate governance mechanisms affects managerial decision making in various 
issues such as the effect of ownership structure on the level of diversification 
(Denis et aI., 1997), board structure on CEO compensation (Core et aI., 1999) and 
board composition on earnings management (Peasnell et aI., 2000). Denis et aI. 
(1997) finds that larger monitoring role by outside shareholders results in firms 
having lower level of value-reducing diversification and Core et al. (1999) find 
that CEO of the firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation. 
Peas nell et al. (2000) finds that good governance reduces incidence of earnings 
management. 
While existing studies document links between diversification, CEO 
compensation and accounting quality with various measurements of corporate 
governance, none of them has ever attempted to look on these issues and their 
relationship with the compliance with the Code. Therefore, there is a gap of 
knowledge in this area, especially in the UK, considering that the Combined Code 
has been in effect since 2000. Other UK studies that look into compliance with the 
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Code have only investigated the link with firm performance and the measurements 
of such compliance was done by self creating an index which could potentially 
lead to selector bias. This study will not suffer from that as I will be using 
compliance data provided by Grant Thornton which is obtained through a written 
agreement with them. 
This study is motivated by the theoretical perspective on the link between 
corporate governance and managerial behaviour which can be explained by the 
agency cost theory. The separation of corporate managers from outside 
stakeholders will result in inherent conflict and there is an assumption that 
managers will act opportunistically to take care of their own interests before the 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This is especially true when the 
managers are given the decision making power and past studies have shown that 
there are many corporate decisions that can be influenced by the manager action 
including the four issues discussed in this study. Therefore there is a need for 
some sort of corporate governance mechanisms by which managers can be 
disciplined to act in the best interest of the stakeholders and it is the intention of 
this study to look into the effect on managerial behaviour when the firm is 
complying with the Code. 
This analysis is based on data for FTSE 350 UK firms from 2003 until 2007. I 
measure compliance with the Code by using compliance index created by Grant 
Thornton and also a revised index which specifically caters to specific issues 
addressed. The measurements for diversification, CEO compensation, accounting 
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quality and excess value of cash holding were based on prior studies that look into 
their relationship with other corporate governance mechanisms. 
I found little evidence to suggest that firms that fully comply with the Code will 
have a lower degree of diversification. However, I discover a significant positive 
relationship between the firms who claim full compliance with the Code and the 
level of CEO compensation, which could complement and provide alternative 
explanation to the findings by previous study. There could be many possibilities 
for this reason, among other that firms that claim full compliance with the Code 
are not willing to reduce CEO compensation especially when the CEO controls 
high percentage of share ownership. I also found no significant relationship 
between compliance with the Code and timeliness of earnings which could 
indicate accounting quality. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
the motivation for the paper, reviews prior studies and formulates my hypotheses. 
Section 3 then discusses the methodology used, followed by a discussion of the 
sample and data collection process in Section 4. I present the results of the study 
in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
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3.2 Motivation, Literature Review and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
There are many approaches and analytical frameworks that can be used to 
diagnose and hopefully solve the problems affecting corporate governance 
especially from the perspectives of the publicly held firms. Keasey, Thomson and 
Wright (1997) outlined four competing perspectives based on Blair's (1995) 
taxonomy. The four schools of thought are the principal-agent model, the myopic 
market model, the abuse of executive power model and the stakeholder model. 
The first two are also commonly viewed as the shareholder perspective and the 
latter two as the stakeholder perspective which has been used in the study by 
O'Sullivan (2000) and Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001). The shareholder 
perspective models will be discussed in this chapter and the stakeholder 
perspective model in the next one. 
Both principal-agent and myopic market models agree that the separation of 
ownership and control may allow manager behavior to be different from 
shareholders' value of profit maximising. On top of that, principal-agent model 
believes that the markets for capital, managerial labour and corporate control is 
the most effective control on managerial discretion and shareholders can 
strengthen this by using their residual voting rights. The model also suggests 
solutions to the corporate governance problems in form of removing restrictions 
on the market, strengthening the incentive system like bonuses and share options 
and introducing a voluntary code. However, myopic market model argues that the 
market systematically undervalues certain long-term expenditures, such as capital 
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investment and R&D spending in favour of short-term market value. Therefore 
the model suggests that shareholders and managers should be encouraged to share 
long-term performance horizon such as increasing shareholders' loyalty and trying 
to keep the other stakeholders such as employees and suppliers in a long-term 
relationship. 
3.2.1.1 Principal-agent model 
The principal-agent model stemmed from an assumption that the social purpose of 
corporations is to maximize shareholders' wealth (Friedman, 1970). It has an 
origin from the earliest corporate law theory which states that the right to 
incorporate is inherent in the right to own property and write contracts, and 
corporations should be regarded as legal extensions of their owners. This theory is 
further updated with a view that the corporation is the property of the 
shareholders, and managers and directors are agents of shareholders, who have 
legal obligations to any other stakeholders (Blair, 1995). The proponents of this 
model also contend that shareholders' interests are best served by maximising 
share price in the short run. This is based on their belief of financial economics' 
theory that the share price today fully reflects the market value of all future profits 
and growth that will accrue to the company. 
There are three aspects that have been mostly outlined by this model; firm as a 
nexus of contracts (Williamson, 1979), the principal-agent relationship in the 
corporation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and market efficiency and market 
discipline (Manne, 1965). 
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When explaining on the agency theory, Jensen & Meckling (1976) describe that 
contractual relations are the essence of the firm and this also covers employees, 
suppliers, customers, creditors and other stakeholders. They contend that the firm 
is not a reality or an individual with motivations and intentions, but a legal fiction 
created by a 'nexus of contracts' of the principal-agent variety. Therefore, in order 
to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal requires having a 
contract that provides safeguards for both of them and this contract must contains 
specifications of their duties, rewards and the rights of the principal to monitor 
their performance. The real issue is then to decide on which incentive systems that 
can effectively align the behaviour of agents with the desires of principals. In 
general, prior studies have focused the discussion on the efficiency of a 
behaviour-oriented contract (e.g. salaries, hierarchical governance) over an 
ou tcome-oriented contract (e. g. commissions, stock options, transfer of property 
rights, market governance). Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that it depends on the 
scenarios presented. If the principal needs to observe the behaviour of the agent, 
then a behaviour-based contract is optimal because the agent's behaviours are 
considered as the purchased commodity, provided this is a simple case of 
complete information. If there is incomplete information, the principal will have 
to decide whether to motivate the manager to work hard by giving generous 
incentives or engage the management in risk bearing. In other words, the principal 
need to find an optimal balance between incentives and transferring risk to the 
agent. 
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Agency problem will occur when agent does not share the principal's 
objectives. This can happens when we hold to the assumption that owners, 
managers and all the other stakeholders within the firm will always try to 
maximise their own utility. This become more prevalent when there is a clear 
separation of ownership and control. When such thing is happening, it will be 
difficult and even expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually 
doing and whether the agent is behaving appropriately. Another problem is that 
the principal might have different attitudes towards risk than the agent. These 
problems will result in principals attempting to ensure that the agents act in 
principals' interests and this management cost has been defined as 'agency cost' 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Again, the solution to this problem can be found by 
producing the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship 
and an optimal incentive scheme to align the behaviour of the agents with the 
interest of the principals. 
Another characteristic of this principal-agent model is the belief that markets are 
the most effective disciplines on managerial discretion. Even though the 
separation of ownership and control may lead the managers to have different 
objectives from the shareholders, it does not going towards inefficiency because 
markets for capital, managerial labour and corporate control provide the most 
effective restraints on managerial discretion. Fama & Jensen (1983) argued that 
even if an owner sells his equity to outsiders, the benefits of flotation and the 
gains from the management professionalism are sufficient to outweigh the costs of 
separation of ownership from control. Therefore, many developments in the 
managerial labour market such as executive share options, leveraged and 
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management buyouts are seen as a corporate governance response to institutional 
deficiencies. Even takeover threat will force the managers to stick to the objective 
of profit maximisation because shareholders hold the ability to vote on takeover 
approaches. In this respect, the principal-agent model insists that corporate 
governance is a market exchange issue and should be allowed to follow its due 
course without any interference. In consequence, if there is any attempt to 
introduce some measures to improve governance, it should be based on a 
voluntary basis such as the Code. 
3.2.1.2 Myopic market model 
The myopic market model shares a lot of similarities with the principal-agent 
model but it argues that the model is fundamentally flawed by an over concern 
with the short-term value of firm's returns and performance, which lead to 
management suffer from 'competitive myopia' (Hayes & Abernathy, 1980). This 
in effect will sacrifice long-term value and competitiveness of the firm. On top of 
that, market pressures will often force the managers to behave in such a way that 
the maximisation of long-term wealth for the shareholders is more than often 
ignored (Blair, 1995). 
There are many studies that look into the corporate governance system of Anglo-
American management. Charkham (1994) argues that British-American corporate 
governance system suffers from a high tension system where information is 
unsatisfactory, boards are not sufficiently responsible to shareholders and the 
firms are rather poor at maintaining standards and securing continuity in the 
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medium and long terms. The managers also are affected by the market pressure 
whenever they make decision towards short-term interest, thus jeopardising the 
development of people with real merit and intrinsic value for long-term ism. 
Sykes (1994) highlighted four main corporate governance weaknesses related to 
failure to meet long-term requirements of both shareholders and management. The 
first weakness is absentee owners. Letza, Hardwick & Ashton (2000) conducted 
an empirical investigation in the UK listed firms and find that external 
shareholders have little or no influence on either CEO or executive board 
turnover, whereas internal shareholdings help to entrench management by 
significantly reducing the rate of CEO and executive turnover. This confirms 
Sykes' argument that institutional shareholders would rather not to exercise their 
influence over the firms because these shareholders had to maintain hundreds of 
investments in their portfolios, making monitoring difficult and competition 
between themselves to attract and retain investment funds are judged on short-
term performance. The second weakness is perverse fund management contracts. 
It is common knowledge that investment institutions impose a short period for the 
fund managers and they were forced to demand firms to provide high dividend 
payouts and high share price over such period. The third weakness is counter-
productive management remuneration and incentives. Studies have shown that in 
the UK and US, management remuneration is poorly related to medium to longer-
term firm profits and share prices and this has resulted in inverse relationship with 
firm performance. The fourth weakness is excessive reliance on takeover threats. 
One of the disadvantages of relying on the threat of hostile takeover to hold 
under-performing management accountable is that sometimes it is too late to 
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rectify poor performance when the underlying losses has been happening for 
several years before. Additionally, there is little evidence that takeovers will 
improve the firm performance in a long run and the transaction costs and 
disruption caused by it can be significant (Franks & Mayer, 2000). All these 
weaknesses mentioned above came from promoting short-termism and Sykes 
argued that in order to create a successful corporate governance system it needs to 
have active shareholders with long-term wealth maximisation and professional 
management with the preconditions and incentives for long-term performance and 
proper accountability to their shareholders. 
The myopic market model is similar to the principal-agent view that the intention 
offirms is to maximise shareholders' wealth. However, the myopic market model 
believes that corporate governance system should provide an environment in 
which shareholders and managers are encouraged to share long-term performance 
horizons. This can be done by implementing several reforms such as locking 
financial institutions into long-term positions, restrictions on the takeover process 
and on voting rights for short-term shareholders, and the empowerment of other 
groups such as employees and suppliers that have long-term relationships with the 
firm (Keasey et aI., 1997). 
Both principal-agent and myopic market models deal with the relationship 
between the principals and their agents, with the focus centred upon short-term 
and long-term visions of corporate governance system. Under any circumstances, 
if there is a lack of control by shareholders, managers are more likely to divert 
firm's resources into non-optimal investments such as value-reducing 
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diversification. higher managerial compensation, excessive spending on firm's 
resources like cash and earnings management. Managers can be encouraged to 
follow shareholders' best interests by stronger governance mechanisms 
implemented within the firm. Thus in the next chapter, we will be looking into 
various governance mechanisms that could help in imposing control over 
managerial behaviour. 
3.2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
One of the activities that can lead to a conflict between shareholders and managers 
is corporate diversification. The debate whether it brings benefits or costs to the 
firm are still ongoing but recent studies have indicated that diversification reduces 
value (Beiner and Schmid, 2005; Jiraporn, Kim & Davidson III, 2007). This does 
not explain why firms remain diversified and many studies have looked into 
characteristics of managers of these firms and the effect on diversification level 
and value. They found that level of diversification is negatively related to 
managerial equity ownership (Denis et aI., 1997) and deeper diversification 
discount occurs when board members are busy holding more outside board 
positions (Jiraporn et al., 2(07). 
Firms that completely comply with the Code will have more independent boards 
of directors among others and they will have more control over the managers' 
actions especially if they decide to engage in a value-reducing diversification. 
Based on this I propose this hypothesis (presented in both null and alternative 
forms): 
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HoI: There is no relationship between full compliance with the Code and the 
level of diversification 
HI: Firms that comply completely with the Code have a lower level of 
diversification 
Literature shows that CEO compensation is important because if it is structured 
correctly, it will align the interest of managers with shareholders. Therefore, many 
studies have looked into the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
CEO compensation. Some have studied the effect of board organisation and 
composition (Core et aI., 1999; Frye, Nelling & Webb, 2006), ownership structure 
(Firth, Fung & Rui, 2007), CEO characteristics (Raj gop ai, Shevlin & Zamora, 
2006) and shareholders rights (Jiraporn, Kim & Davidson III, 2005; Davila & 
Penal va, 2006) on CEO compensation. All these studies found that weaker 
governance mechanisms will lead to a higher CEO compensation. Based on this I 
proposed these hypotheses (presented in both null and alternative forms): 
Ho2: There is no relationship between firms that comply completely with the 
Code and CEO compensation 
H2: Firms that comply completely with the Code have lower CEO 
compensation 
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If interests of managers and shareholders are not aligned, managers will have 
incentives to manipulate reported earnings especially if their compensation 
contracts depend on it. Therefore, it is important for the shareholders to ensure 
that there is a high standard of accounting quality in the financial reporting. 
There are many studies that look into how governance mechanisms such as board 
composition and ownership structure link to various dimensions of accounting 
quality such as earnings management (Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2000), timeliness 
(Bushman, Chen, Engel & Smith, 2004; Beekes et ai., 2004) and conservatism 
(Beekes et aI., 2004). Their results suggest that these governance mechanisms 
promote higher accounting quality such as less income-increasing accrual 
management (Peasnell et ai., 2000) and timeliness of earnings (Be ekes et aI., 
2004; Bushman et aI., 2004). Based on these findings I proposed these hypotheses 
(presented in both null and alternative forms): 
Ho3a: There is no relationship between firms that comply completely with the 
Code and the reflection of bad news in earnings in a timelier manner 
H3a: Firms that comply completely with the Code reflect bad news in earnings 
in a timelier manner 
Ho3b: There is no relationship between firms that comply completely with the 
Code and the reflection of good news in earnings in a timelier manner 
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H3b: Firms that comply completely with the Code reflect good news in 
earnings in a timelier manner 
3.3 Research Methodology 
In this section I present the regression models used in the empirical analysis and 
discuss how I measure compliance with the Code and managerial behaviour. I 
then discuss the control variables used in the models. 
3.3.1 REGRESSION MODELS 
This study employs ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model for each 
hypothesis presented in the previous section and most of these models are based 
on the previous works done on the subject issues. 
3.3.1.1 Diversification Model 
The first diversification model is based on the works by Denis et al. (1997) which 
look into the relationship between agency problems, equity ownership and 
corporate diversification. The diversification model for H1 is specified as below: 
LevelDivi" = /30 + /31 COMi" + /31 Controlsi,/ + ci,/ (1) 
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where LeveLDiv is a proxy for the level of diversification, measured using number 
of segments reported by the management; COM is a proxy for compliance with 
the Code; Controls are an additional determinants of the level of diversification; £ 
is the error term and i and t are firm and time subscripts respectively. 
3.3.1.2 CEO Compensation Models 
The CEO compensation model is based on the works by Core et al. (1999) which 
look into the relationship between corporate governance, CEO compensation and 
firm performance. The CEO compensation model for H2 is specified as below: 
SalaryCompi,1 = /30 + /31 COMU-l + /32 Controlsi,l_l + ci,1 (2) 
CashCompi,1 = /30 + /31 COMi,l_l + /32 Controls;,l_l + ci,1 (3) 
where SalaryComp is a proxy for component of compensation that is fixed at the 
beginning of the year; CashComp is a proxy for the sum of salary and annual 
bonus; COM is a proxy for compliance with the Code; Controls are an additional 
determinants of the CEO compensation: £ is the error term and i and t are firm and 
time subscripts respectively. 
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3.3.1.3 Accounting Quality Model 
The accounting quality model is based on the works by Beekes et al. (2004) who 
look into the link between earnings timeliness, earnings conservatism and board 
composition. The model for H3 is specified as below: 
EPS;,/ = /30 + /31RETi,/+ /32 NEGi,/ + /33 NEG;,/. RET;,/ + /34 COM;,/ + /35 NEGi,/' 
COM;,/ + /36 COM;,/ • RETi,/ + /37 NEGi,/ • COMi,/ • RET;,/ + /38 Controlsi,/ + [;i,/ 
(4) 
where EPS is a proxy for earnings per share scaled by prior year-end price9; RET 
is a proxy for 12-month raw returns beginning eight months before the fiscal year-
end and ending four months after the year-end; NEG is a proxy for dummy 
variable coded 1 if returns are negative, 0 otherwise; COM is a proxy for dummy 
variable coded 1 if firm claims full compliance with the Code, 0 otherwise; 
Controls are additional determinants of the EPS; E is the error term and i and tare 
firm and time subscripts respectively. An interaction between NEG and RET is to 
proxy for bad news (H3a) and the main effect of RET is a proxy for good news 
(H3b). I included COM into the interaction of these two variables to understand 
the effect of compliance with the Code under two separate circumstances. 
Y EPS is calculated by dividing net income (minus any dividends on preference shares) with 
average outstanding shares 
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Therefore if there is good news and no compliance with the code only the main 
effect of RET will remains in the model. 
Whenever a firm complies with the Code, it will have a greater number of 
independent directors on its board. They will exercise a greater monitoring role 
and can improve the timeliness of reporting earnings. Such action will have an 
immediate impact on managers especially when they are making accounting-
based decisions. Therefore the models above are presented without any lagged 
variables. 
3.3.2 COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE AND ISSUES RELATED TO 
MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 
Previously, study on the compliance level of the Code had to rely on self-
constructed indices (Padgett & Shabbir, 2005; Arcot & Bruno, 2007) and survey 
(MacNeil & Li, 2006) since such data were not available publicly in any database 
or publication. However, since 2002, Grant Thornton UK LLP has started to 
review and publish annual study on the level of compliance for FfSE 350 firms. 
Through a series of discussions, they have agreed to provide me with their raw 
data for the year 2004 until 2007. Grant Thornton have their own compliance 
index and I have included their index in my study together with the amended 
index to incorporate stringent requirements to link relationship between 
compliance with the Code and various issues studied. 
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I used measurements on various issues such as diversification, CEO compensation 
and accounting quality based from the past studies in order to provide 
comparability with them. 
3.3.2.1 Measuring Compliance with the Code 
In order to measure compliance rate, I will use several levels of measurement 
starting from a basic measurement to a more refined measurement. The first level 
is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm announces in their annual report that they 
fully comply with the Code, 0 otherwise. The second level is a continuous 
variable where percentage of compliance to the Code is measured using Grant 
Thornton questionnaire method (20 questions based on the principles in the Code, 
see Table 3.1). I decided to refine this index further by introducing third level of 
measurement because some of the questions posed by Grant Thornton are merely 
informational in nature and not really promoting the true objectives of the Codew. 
Therefore I created several compliance indexes that consist of requirements that 
truly promote corporate governance. Each index will be modified to correspond to 
specific issues because many studies have argued that there is no one 'best' 
measure of corporate governance since it needs to look into the context of the 
specific issue and firm's specific circumstances (Arcot & Bruno, 2007; Bhagat, 
Bolton & Romano, 2007). 
10 For example, one of the questions asked by Grant Thornton is whether the terms and conditions 
of appointment of non-executive directors are available for inspection. 
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Therefore, diversification model will use a compliance index based on four 
questions from Grant Thornton index only. CEO compensation model will have 
additional two questions on remuneration committee and three questions on audit 
committee on top of the four questions used in diversification model. Accounting 
quality will only use the first level of compliance variable due to the need to see 
its interaction effect with bad news and good news variables. Table 3.2 listed 
these revised questions. 
3.3.2.2 Measuring Issues Related to Managerial Decision Making 
To measure the level of diversification I use the number of business segments 
reported by the management. There are two different measurements of CEO 
compensation: salary and cash compensation. Salary compensation measures the 
fixed component compensation at the beginning of the year. Cash compensation is 
the total of salary and annual bonus. To measure accounting quality, I use 
earnings per share scaled by prior year-end price as dependent variable to see if 
compliance with the Code plays any role in influencing the timeliness of earnings. 
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3.3.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
3.3.3.1 Control Variables for a Diversification Model 
In the diversification model, there are six control variables. OwnBlock is a proxy 
for the equity ownership of outside blockholders. Outside blockholders are 
defined as those holders of at least 5 percent of the firm's shares that are not 
related to the top management team. This variable is used to control for 
monitoring role by the significant blockholders over diversification exercises as 
suggested by agency cost hypothesis (Denis et aI., 1997). OwnDir is a proxy for 
the equity ownership of directors. It is suggested that managers with more 
personal wealth invested in the firm seek to reduce risk through diversifying 
acquisitions (May, 1995). Sometimes firms have large amounts of firm-specific 
knowledge that is not transferable to other lines of business and therefore I use 
R&Dsales to proxy for this R&D intensity. Analyst is a proxy for the number of 
analysts following the firm to control for information asymmetries. I also include 
Industry as a proxy for a dummy variable for industry and Size as a proxy for firm 
size which is the natural log of the firm's market capitalisation. 
3.3.3.2 Control Variables for CEO Compensation Models 
In the CEO compensation model, there are six control variables that could also be 
determinants for CEO compensation. I use Sales (using natural log of sales) for 
the year prior to the year in which compensation is awarded to proxy for firm size 
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and complexity. This control variable is important because larger firms with 
higher complexity will demand more competent managers which will results in 
higher compensation level (Core et al., 1999). I also include ROA (earnings before 
interest and taxes over total assets for the prior year) and RET (percentage share 
market return for the prior year) as the proxies for firm performance to be 
consistent with other studies on CEO compensation (Smith & Watts, 1992). 
To control for the monitoring role by larger shareholders, I use OwnCEO to proxy 
for percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO. I also use NonCE05% to 
proxy for dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has an internal board member who 
owns at least 5% of the outstanding shares and 0 otherwise because a similar 
study by Core et al. (1997) find a negative relationship. Finally, I use OwnBlock 
as a proxy for dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has an external blockholder 
who own at least 5% of the outstanding shares and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.3.3 Control Variables for an Accounting Quality Model 
In the accounting quality model, I use four variables to control for other 
determinants of accounting quality. I use Size as a proxy for firm size (in natural 
log), Auditor as a proxy for auditor type and OwnDir and OwnBlock to proxy for 
the monitoring role by larger shareholders. 
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3.4 Sample, Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The initial sample of finns used for this study is based on the FfSE 350 UK firms 
(excluding financial and utility firms) for each year from 2003 until 2007. These 
firms were selected because they were in the Grant Thornton Annual FfSE 350 
Corporate Governance Review (2004 - 2007) to which Grant Thornton UK LLP 
has agreed to provide their raw data to me to analyse further for the purpose of 
h· d 11 t IS stu y . 
From the initial set of sample from Grant Thornton, several firms were omitted for 
the reasons such as firms that have been undergoing acquisition, merger, demerger 
and being delisted from the stock exchange as their data is no longer available in 
the database. Table 3.3 shows the final sample for each year from 2003 until 2007 
including the compliance rate compiled by Grant Thornton each year. Since the 
number of firms in the sample has been slightly changed, I have adjusted the 
compliance rate to the Code which has been reported earlier by Grant Thornton 
using their original sample. 
3.4.2 DATA 
Compliance with the Code data is obtained from the Grant Thornton Annual 
FfSE 350 Corporate Governance Review raw data for each year from 2003 until 
2007. This raw data consists of survey information on each individual firm in the 
11 Even though the start date of Review is 2004, most of the annual reports in the 2004 survey are 
actually for the financial year ending during 2003. 
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FTSE 350. The survey questions are driven directly from the Code provisions and 
Turnbull guidance and are created to reflect the 'best practice' as perceived by the 
Code. The survey is completed by reading the hard copies of each firm's annual 
report and accounts, focusing on the front half of the report (i.e. not the accounts) 
including the sections; Business Review, Corporate Responsibility, Corporate 
Governance and Remuneration Report. 
The number of segments reported by the management and all other financial data 
are obtained from Datastream and FAME database. Number of analysts following 
the firms is obtained from I/B/E/S database. Shareholders ownership structure is 
obtained from Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbook. This data is hand collected 
from the ownership structure report section of the corresponding firm's published 
annual report and accounts. CEO compensation and management share ownership 
data is obtained from Manifest database. 
3.4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 3.4 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for Hi 
to H3. Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used in 
the diversification model. Mean for LevelDiv is 3.21 with a standard deviation of 
1.6 and skewness of 0.84 which implies normal distribution. This is slightly 
higher than what Denis et al. (1997) reported in their sample of US firm in 1984 
which has a mean of 2.41. Mean for CwimFull12 is 0.39 with a standard deviation 
\2 ClaimFull is a dummy variable for firms clai ming full compliance with the Code with 1 
indicates claim of full compliance and 0 otherwise. 
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of 0.49 and skewness of 0.47. Mean for Comp2013 is 0.79 with a standard 
deviation of 0.16. Mean for Comp414 is 0.74 with a standard deviation of 0.24. 
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used in the CEO 
compensation model. Mean for SalaryComp is £504,533 and mean for CashComp 
is £888,546 which indicates that salary in this sample is about 57% from total 
cash compensation. Conyon, Peck, Read and Sadler (2000) observed salary of 200 
large UK firms and found it to be 71 % of total cash remuneration, with median 
total cash pay to be £390,000. This means that bonus cash payment has greater 
representation in the CEO compensation and CEO are also receiving higher pay in 
recent years. Mean for ClaimFull is 0.39 with a standard deviation of 0.49 and 
skewness of 0.46. Mean for Comp20 is 0.79 with a standard deviation of 0.15. 
Mean for Comp915 is 0.78 with a standard deviation of 0.18. 
Panel C of Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used in the 
accounting quality model. Mean for EPS is 0.08 with a standard deviation of 0.l3. 
This is slightly higher than 0.059 mean for EPS reported by Beekes et al. (2004) 
which uses sample data of firms from 1993 to 1995. This indicates that on average 
top firms in the UK have been performing better for the past 10 years. The share 
returns has also improved with mean for RET is 0.26 with a standard deviation of 
0.4 compared to mean of 0.193 for RET in the sample study of Beekes et al. 
u Comp20 is a compliance variable for number of criteria fulfilled by the firms out of20 set of 
questions set by Grant Thornton to determine full compliance with the Code. 
14 Comp4 is a compliance variable for number of criteria fulfilled by the firms out of a specific set 
of 4 questions relating to most basic and important principles in the Code. 
15 Comp9 is a compliance variable for number of criteria fulfilled by the firms out of a specific set 
of 4 questions relating to most basic and important principles in the Code and 5 questions relating 
to audit committee and remuneration committee. 
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(2004). Mean for ClaimFull is 0.39 with a standard deviation of 0.49 and 
skewness of 0.45. 
In addition of looking into the skewness of the data, Q-Q plots have been 
employed to check the deviations of the data from the normal distribution. Q_Q 
plots for Hl, H2, H3a and H3b are presented in the Appendix A, Band C 
respectively. 
3.5 Analysis 
This section examines the relation between compliance with the Code and various 
managerial behaviour measures such as diversification, CEO compensation and 
accounting quality of FTSE 350 UK firms from 2003 until 2007. I report the main 
regression results in the next section. 
3.5.1 RESULTS 
Table 3.5 reports coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for ordinary 
least square regression estimated using the full sample of 728 for level of 
diversifications. The adjusted r-squared for models using ClaimFull, Comp20 and 
Comp4 as its compliance variables are 0.2249,0.2249 and 0.2251, indicating that 
the model explains a reasonable amount of cross-sectional variation in level of 
diversifications. However results indicate that there is no significant relationship 
between compliance with the Code and level of diversifications. This continues 
the argument among previous study whether improving corporate governance will 
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really effect the level of diversifications undertook by the firms. Nevertheless, one 
control variable, OwnDir (total shares held by executive directors over the total 
number of shares outstanding) has a significant negative relationship with the 
level of diversifications. This means that executive directors with high ownership 
of the firm will prefer to have lower number of diversifications. This is consistent 
with Denis et al. (1997) which prove that directors believe that diversification will 
reduce the value of the firm. 
Table 3.6 presents regression results for CEO compensation models. The adjusted 
r-squared for all 9 models are quite high, ranging from 0.2398 up to 0.4880, 
indicating that the model explains a reasonable amount of cross-sectional 
variation in CEO compensations. I found a significant positive relationship 
between total cash compensation and ClaimFull variable but could not find any 
significant relationship between any type of compensation and two other 
compliance variables (Comp20 and Comp9). This positive relationship can be 
explained by several significant relationships among the control variables. Sales 
has a significant positive relationship that indicates CEO performance is based on 
firm performance. This is quite an interesting link because it agrees with the 
findings of Watson and Wilson (2005) that questioned many previous studies of 
large firms who are unable to find any significant link between par and 
performance measurement measures. OwnCEO (percentage of outstanding shares 
owned by the CEO) also has a positive significant relationship with CEO 
compensation which means that the higher percentage of CEO ownership in the 
firm, the higher compensation will be given by the firm to the CEO. As 
discovered by Core et al. (1997) I also found that NonCE05% (dummy variable 
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coded 1 if the firm has an internal board member who own at least 5% of the 
outstanding shares and 0 otherwise) has a significant negative relationship with 
CEO compensation, which indicates that large individual shareholder still have 
control over the CEO compensation. Overall results suggest firms that claim full 
compliance with the Code will have higher level of CEO compensation. This 
notion is further enforced when CEO controls a significant percentage of the 
share. However, significant shareholders who remain in board of directors will 
also have an influence on the level of CEO compensation. 
A regression result for accounting quality model is presented in Table 3.7. I could 
not find any significant relationship between timeliness of earnings and 
compliance with the Code. The model has a very low adjusted r-square even 
though some of the variables did show some positive relationship like Size and 
RET. The positive relationships shown by these two variables were also reported 
by Beekes et al. (2004) but unlike their study I am unable to find any significant 
relationship among all those interaction variables. The summary table for 
outcomes for all hypotheses is presented in Table 3.8. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the relationship between compliance with the Code and 
issues related to managerial decision making such as level of diversification, CEO 
compensation and accounting quality. Whilst previous studies have look into 
relationship between these issues and various measurements of corporate 
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governance, none of them has used compliance with the Code as a determinant 
governance factor. This is crucial because full compliance with the Code has been 
advocated vigorously by FRS in lieu with recent accounting scandals happening 
in the UK and all over the worlds. In addition, findings by Grant Thornton which 
show that less than half of FfSE 350 firms can claim full compliance with the 
Code is seem perplexing and need further investigation on the usefulness of actual 
compliance with the Code itself. This chapter adds to current literature by 
providing a UK perspective on the measurements of corporate governance and 
what impact it has on various issues on managerial decision making. 
Three hypotheses were tested. I find level of CEO compensation to be 
significantly related to the claim of full compliance by the FTSE 350 firms. 
However, no significant relationship was found between compliance with the 
Code and level of diversification and timeliness of earnings. 
Limitations of the analysis are as follows. Due to various issues need to be 
covered in this chapter and the next two chapters, the study only uses one specific 
model to analyse the relationship between each issue and compliance with the 
Code. However, past studies have employed various methods and different 
measurements for each issue, and selecting more than one method could produce 
better results and understanding on these relationships. 
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For example, instead of looking into just levels of diversification, I could expand 
the study to include a model that will explore the relationship between value of 
diversification using Berger and Ofek (1995) model. I could also improve the 
CEO compensation model by including valuation of share options, performance 
plans, phantom and restricted share received by the CEO which was done in a 
study by Core et al. (1999). Accounting quality model can also be improved by 
looking into another perspective by analysing abnormal accrual as studied by 
Peasnell et al. (2000) which look into the association between board composition 
and earnings management activity using the modified-Jones model. Future 
research could employ this alternative models and measurements to better capture 
the relationship between various issues of managerial decision making and 
compliance with the Code. 
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TABLE 3.1 
Grant Thornton 20 Questions 
No. Questions Section in 
the Code 
1 Does the report identify the chairman, chief executive, senior A1.2 
independent, members and chairs of the nomination, audit and 
remuneration committees? 
2 Is the number of meetings of the board and overall attendance A1.2 
disclosed? 
3 Led by the senior independent, do the non-executive directors A 1.3 
meet without the chairman at least annually to appraise the 
chairman's performance? 
4 Are the roles of the chairman and chief executive exercised by A2 
the same individual? 
S Is at least half of the board comprised of independent non- A3.2 
executive directors? 
6 Are the terms and conditions of appointment of non-executive A4.4 
directors available for inspection? 
7 Is there a description of the work of the nomination committee, A4.6 
including the process it has used in relation to board 
appointments? 
8 Are the majority of nomination committee members NEDs and AS.1 
is the chairman either chairman of the board or a NED? 
9 Does the company state the potential maximum remuneration B.l.l 
available including performance related elements? 
10 Are there at least three remuneration committee members, all B.2.1 
of whom are independent NEDs? 
11 Is it stated that the board (or shareholders where required) set B.2.3 
the remuneration for the non-executive directors? 
12 Is there a statement that a review of the effectiveness of the C.2.1 
group's internal controls has been undertaken at least annually? 
13 Is there a statement that this review covers all material controls C.2.1 
including financial, operational and compliance controls, and 
risk management systems? 
14 Are all the audit committee members independent NEDs? C.3.1 
66 
15 Does the audit committee state to have at least one member C3.1 
with recent and relevant financial experience? 
16 Does the audit committee monitor and review the effectiveness C3.2 
of internal audit activities? 
17 Is there a separate section of the annual report which describes C3.3 
the work of committee? 
18 If the auditor provides non-audit services, is there a statement C3.7 
as to how the auditor's objectivity and independence is 
safeguarded? 
19 Are terms and reference available for the audit, remuneration N/A 
and nomination committees? 
20 Do they have an internal audit function or equivalent? N/A 
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TABLE 3.2 
Revised Compliance Index 
No. Questions Categories 
1 Led by the senior independent, do the non- Non-Executive 
executive directors meet without the chairman at Directors 
least annually to appraise the chairman's 
performance? 
2 Is at least half of the board comprised of Non-Executive 
independent non-executive directors? Directors 
3 Are the roles of the chairman and chief executive Board and Committees 
exercised by the same individual? 
4 Are the majority of nomination committee Nomination Committee 
members NEDs and is the chairman either 
chairman of the board or a NED? 
5 Does the company state the potential maximum Remuneration 
remuneration available including performance Committee 
related elements? 
6 Are there at least three remuneration committee Remuneration 
members, all of whom are independent NEDs? Committee 
7 Are all the audit committee members Audit Committee 
independent NEDs? 
8 Does the audit committee monitor and review Audit Committee 
the effectiveness of internal audit activities? 
9 Do they have an internal audit function or Audit Committee 
equivalent? 
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TABLE 3.3 
Sample Selection Filters 
No. of sample from Grant 
Thornton Review 
No. of sample after 
redistribution according to end 
of financial year 
less Takover, delisted and others 
Final Sample 
Claim of full compliance rate 
from Grant Thornton Review 
2003 
n/a 
267 
107 
160 
n/a 
Year 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
315 320 314 306 
312 306 275 95 
97 74 28 16 
215 232 247 79 
57.80% 27.60% 34.10% 40.80% 
Claim of full compliance rate 53.75% 39.53% 27.59% 43.32% 40.51% 
from Final Sample 
The table presents a breakdown of the sample selection process. The initial sample 
of firms consisted of firms included in Grant Thornton raw data. Details of 
reasons for omission are presented, together with the final sample and revised 
compliance rate. 
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TABLE 3.4 
Descriptive Statistics for Diversification, CEO Compensation and Accounting 
Qua lity models 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for Diversification model 
N min max mean stdev skew kurt 
LeveLDiv 720 1 9 3.21 1.60 0.84 0.97 
ClaimFull 720 0 1 0.39 0.49 0.47 -1.79 
Comp20 720 0.15 1 0.79 0.16 -1.06 1.14 
Comp4 720 0 1 0.74 0.24 -0.67 -0.18 
OwnDir 72fJ 0 0.88 0.04 0.12 3.99 16.89 
OwnBlock 72fJ 0 1 0.53 0.50 -0.11 -1.99 
Size 720 19.04 25.29 21.09 1.19 1.05 1.01 
R&Dsales 72fJ 0 0.19 0.00 0.01 8.28 81.17 
Analyst 72fJ 1 29 8.32 5.22 0.78 0.33 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for CEO Compensation model 
N min max mean Stdev skew kurt 
SalaryComp 485 2692 1551000 504532.98 222356.69 1.11 1.58 
CashComp 485 2692 7569000 888545.69 831572.83 3.64 18.25 
ClaimFuII 485 0 1 0.39 0.49 0.46 -1.79 
Comp20 485 0.25 1 0.79 0.15 -1.04 0.97 
Comp9 485 0.11 1 0.78 0.18 -1.00 1.11 
Sales (I' million) 485 1.84 42,641.00 3330.79 6112.60 3.52 13.86 
ROA 485 -0.66 3.99 0.58 0.62 2.03 5.60 
RET 485 -0.86 1.83 0.25 0.34 0.68 2.96 
OwnCEO 485 0 1 0.06 0.24 3.58 10.84 
NonCE05% 485 0 1 0.08 0.27 3.10 7.61 
OwnBloek 485 0 1 0.49 0.50 0.03 -2.01 
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics for Accounting Quality model 
N min max mean Stdev skew kurt 
EPS 650 -0.01 0.30 0.07 0.05 1.07 2.08 
Size 650 11.51 25.40 21.22 1.37 0.28 4.37 
Auditor 650 0 1 0.99 0.08 -12.66 158.73 
OwnDir 650 0 0.88 0.03 0.11 4.74 25.26 
OwnB10 ck 650 0 1 0.49 0.50 0.02 -2.01 
RET 650 -0.86 2.48 0.25 0.37 1.27 5.84 
NEG 650 0 1 0.16 0.37 1.81 1.29 
Cia imFu II 650 0 1 0.38 0.49 0.48 -1.78 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for Diversification, CEO 
Compensation and Accounting Quality model in the sample. Panel A presents the 
statistics for all the variables used in Diversification model, Panel B presents the 
statistics for all the variables used in CEO Compensation model and Panel C 
presents the statistics for all the variables used in Accounting Quality model. 
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TABLE 3.5 
OLS Regression Results for Hi 
Independent CompFull Comp20 Comp4 
variables est. co-eff. F- p-vaiue est. co-eff. F- p-value est. co-eff. F-value value value p-value 
Intercept 2.110 9.065 0.000 2.092 5.170 0.000 2.173 7.430 0.000 
Y2003 0.039 0.225 0.822 0.040 0.210 0.833 0.020 0.113 0.910 
Y2004 0.112 0.705 0.481 0.115 0.682 0.495 0.097 0.594 0.553 
Y2005 0.066 0.449 0.654 0.069 0.470 0.639 0.061 0.415 0.678 
Y2007 0.018 0.088 0.930 0.020 0.095 0.925 0.019 0.091 0.927 
Size 0.000 -0.846 0.398 0.000 -0.859 0.391 0.000 -0.841 0.401 
OwnDir -1.214 -2.332 0.020 -1.205 -2.313 0.021 -1.240 -2.361 0.018 
OwnBlock -0.173 -1.491 0.136 -0.171 -1.484 0.138 -0.173 -1.498 0.135 
NoAnalysts 0.020 1.467 0.143 0.019 1.438 0.151 0.020 1.500 0.134 
R&D/Sales -3.272 -1.108 0.268 -3.272 -1.108 0.268 -3.328 -1.126 0.261 
Compliance 
variables -0.014 -0.122 0.903 0.017 0.040 0.968 -0.098 -0.371 0.711 
R-Square 0.284 0.284 0.284 
Adj. R-Square 0.225 0.225 0.225 
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TABLE 3.6 
OLS Regression Results for H2 
Independent variables SalaryFuli CashFull Salary20 Cash20 Salary9 Cash9 
Intercept -1792994 -3200288 -1789018 -3255975 -1794720 
-3245225 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1'2003 593 -603948 -3187 -556230 -157 -593367 
0.980 0.000 0.904 0.000 0.995 0.000 
1'2004 2560 -489009 -53 -477147 1092 -510573 
0.901 0.000 0.998 0.000 0.959 0.000 
1'2005 -4921 -169467 -5898 -190349 -5621 -200692 
0.814 0.074 0.777 0.045 0.787 0.034 
1'2007 -9199 187100 -8844 184893 -9284 186240 
0.748 0.150 0.757 0.157 0.745 0.153 
Sales 110487 204190 111153 204706 111052 214894 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA -16829 -2341 -17180 -8297 -17152 -13085 
0.163 0.966 0.154 0.880 0.155 0.812 
RET -37588 -35680 -38054 -27031 -37815 -33604 
0.080 0.713 0.077 0.782 0.078 0.731 
OwnCEO -38610 471846 -39494 472144 -39068 461859 
0.235 0.001 0.226 0.002 0.230 0.002 
NonCE05% -15726 -417692 -16733 -412982 -16428 -427454 
0.590 0.002 0.568 0.002 0.575 0.001 
OwnBlock 15966 39571 15927 26203 15893 27196 
0.281 0.555 0.280 0.696 0.281 0.685 
Compliance 1276 142398 -19454 128304 -10954 -127002 
variables 0.934 0.042 0.755 0.652 0.816 0.553 
R-Square 0.4995 0.2633 0.4996 0.2571 0.4996 0.2574 
Adj. R-Square 0.4879 0.2462 0.4880 0.2398 0.4880 0.2401 
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This table presents the OLS regression results for H2 with its estimated co-
efficients and its p values beneath in italic. Column SalaryFull is for model that 
uses salary compensation as dependent variable and ClaimFull as its governance 
variable. Column CashFull is for model that uses total cash (salary and bonus) 
compensation as dependent variable and ClaimFuli as its governance variable. 
Column Salary20 is for model that uses salary compensation as dependent 
variable and Comp20 as its governance variable. Column Cash20 is for model that 
uses total cash (salary and bonus) compensation as dependent variable and 
Comp20 as its governance variable. Column Salary9 is for model that uses salary 
compensation as dependent variable and Comp9 as its governance variable. 
Column Cash9 is for model that uses total cash (salary and bonus) compensation 
as dependent variable and Comp9 as its governance variable. 
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TABLE 3.7 
OLS Regression Results for H3a and H3b 
Independent variables EPS 
est. co-eff. p-value 
Intercept 0.240 0.000 
Y2003 0.001 0.909 
Y2004 0.011 0.033 
Y2006 -0.003 0.493 
Y2007 -0.006 0.422 
RET 0.023 0.004 
NEG -0.009 0.310 
NEG*RET 0.042 0.129 
COM 0.006 0.292 
NEG * COM 0.016 0.267 
COM*RET 0.000 0.979 
NEG*COM*RET 0.021 0.644 
Size -0.008 0.000 
Auditor -0.007 0.780 
OwnDir -0.016 0.364 
OwnBlock 0.000 0.982 
R Square 0.1480 
0.1279 
Adjusted R Square 
F value 4.839 
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TABLE 3.8 
Summary of outcomes for aLL hypotheses 
Hypothesis Hypotheses Outcomes 
No. 
Hi Firms that comply completely with the Fail to reject HoI 
Code have a lower level of diversification 
H2 Firms that comply completely with the Reject Ha2, firms that 
Code have lower CEO compensation fully comply with the 
Code have higher CEO 
cOIIlpensation 
H3a Firms that comply completely with the Fail to reject HaJa 
Code reflect bad news in earnings in a 
timelier manner 
H3b Firms that comply completely with the Fail to reject HaJb 
Code reflect good news in earnings in a 
timelier manner 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE AND ISSUES RELATED TO THE 
WELFARE OF SHAREHOLDERS 
4.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the relationship between compliance with the Code and 
issues related to the welfare of shareholders such as disclosure quality, CEO 
turnover, compensation disclosure quality and firm performance. Earlier studies 
have investigated how various corporate governance mechanisms safeguard the 
welfare of shareholders in various issues and found that better governed firms 
make more informative disclosures (Beekes & Brown, 2006) improved 
performance after CEO turnover (Huson et aI., 2004) and have higher 
compensation disclosure quality (Conyon et aI., 2002). There are also many 
studies that have attempted to look into the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance (Fama & French, 1992; Padgett & Shabbir, 
2005; Core et al., 2006) 
While existing studies document links between disclosure quality, CEO turnover 
and compensation disclosure quality with various measurements of corporate 
governance, none of them has ever attempted to look into these issues and their 
relationship with the compliance with the Code. There are several UK studies that 
have looked into relationship between compliance with the Code and firm 
performance but all of them created their own index which could induce selection 
bias. Therefore, there is a gap of knowledge in this area especially in the UK 
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considering that the Combined Code has been in effect since 2000. Other UK 
studies that look into compliance with the Code have only investigated the link 
with firm performance and the measurements of such compliance was done by 
self creating an index which could potentially leads to selection bias. As with 
Chapter Three, this study will not suffer from that as I will be using compliance 
data provided by Grant Thornton which is obtained through a written agreement 
with them. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three this study is also motivated by the theoretical 
perspective on the link between corporate governance and managerial behaviour 
which can be explained by the agency cost theory. The separation of corporate 
managers from outside shareholders will result in inherent conflict and there is an 
assumption that managers will act opportunistically to take care of their own 
interests before the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This is especially 
true when the managers are given the decision making power and past studies 
have shown that there are many corporate decisions that can be influenced by the 
managers action including the four issues discussed in this study. Therefore there 
is a need for some sort of corporate governance mechanisms such as the Code by 
which managers can be disciplined to act in the best interest of the shareholders. 
This analysis is based on the data for FfSE 350 UK firms from 2003 until 2007. I 
measure compliance with the Code by using a compliance index created by Grant 
Thornton and also a revised index which specifically caters to specific issues 
addressed. The measurements for disclosure quality, CEO turnover, compensation 
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disclosure quality and firm performance were based on prior studies that look into 
their relationship with other corporate governance mechanisms. 
I found that firms that comply with the crucial principles in the Code have a lower 
analyst bias and a larger analyst following. I also found that there is no 
relationship between compliance with the Code and CEO turnover. There is some 
evidence that compliance with the Code affects compensation disclosure quality. 
There is also some evidence that firms are trying to mask their underperformance 
by claiming full compliance with the Code in their annual report. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
the motivation for the paper, reviews prior studies and formulates my hypotheses. 
Section 3 then discusses the methodology used, followed by a discussion of the 
sample and data collection process in Section 4. I present the results of the study 
in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
4.2 Motivation, Literature Review and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
Firms with strong governance mechanism in place will safeguard the welfare of 
shareholders in term of maintaining high quality of disclosure and will not 
hesitant to replace its CEO if they are not performing well. 
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There are four schools of thought that can best describe problems and solutions 
affecting corporate governance and they are the principal-agent model, the myopic 
market model, the abuse of executive power model and the stakeholder model. 
The first two have been discussed in previous chapter and the stakeholder 
perspective model will be discussed here. 
4.2.1.1 The abuse of executive power model 
The abuse of executive power model argues that abuse of executive power is a 
major problem in the corporation governance structure. Supporters of this view 
contend that management have been given excessive power to serve their own 
interest at the expense of shareholders and none of the current institutional 
restraints such as non-executive directors, the audit process and the threat of 
takeover can prevent them. The abuse of executive power is usually manifested in 
the problem of executive overpay. Studies have shown that executive 
remuneration has risen far faster than average earnings and the link between 
compensation and management performance has been very weak (Conyon, Gregg 
& Machin, 1995). Executive pay is bettered by share option schemes and 
management have been known to write themselves contracts that will benefit them 
no matter how the firm is performing (Keasey et aI., 1997). Even the introduction 
of independent remuneration committees is not effective because it is still open to 
abuse by the management. 
The supporters of this model also do not believe that the shareholders are capable 
on monitoring the action of the management and they also do not agree that 
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managers are the agents of shareholders. Instead, they claim that managers are 
trustees of the firm and thus there should be different ways to implement 
corporate governance system inside the firm. Kay & Silberston (1995) explained 
that the responsibility of the trustees is far wider than the agents. Rather than 
focusing on serving the financial interest of the firms, the managers also need to 
consider the skills of employees, the expectations of customers and suppliers, and 
the firms' reputation in the community. Managers also have to consider the 
interests of present and future stakeholders and long-term business development 
of the firm. Therefore, Kyle & Silberston (1995) argued that the appropriate 
governance reform is more towards statutory changes such as amending the 
statutory duties of the directors to include promoting the business of the firm and 
to balance the shareholders' claims. In addition, the appointment of directors and 
senior managers will be under the responsibilities of independent parties and the 
appointment of a CEO should be based on a fixed term basis with only one time 
renewal of the contract if necessary. This in tum will prevent hostile takeover 
since large ownership of shares no longer has the right to appoint managers at will 
and this reform will give executive management the freedom to develop the 
longer term vision of the business and at the same time responsible to various 
stakeholders of the firm. 
4.2.1.2 The stakeholder model 
The proponents of the stakeholder model argue that objectives and purpose of the 
firm should not be limited to the maximisation of shareholder welfare alone. Other 
groups such as customers, suppliers, employees and managers should also be 
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recognized. Keasey et al. (1997) suggest that a wider objective function of the 
firm is not only more equitable but also more socially efficient than one confined 
to shareholder wealth. 
The concept of stakeholder theory was first introduced by Freeman (1984) and he 
defines a stakeholder as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the finn's objectives. He argued that those groups of 
stakeholders are vital to the survival and success of the firm and therefore 
strategic management model should be sensitive to them. 
There are two principal ways to demonstrate the efficiency of the stakeholder 
model and this is explained by Keasey et al. (1997). The first way is to build up a 
reputation for the ethical treatment of customers, suppliers and employees in order 
to cement trust relations, which will leads to profitable investments and mutually 
beneficial exchanges. This is because ethical behaviour can reduce the costs of 
social association. The second efficiency case is where extensive stakeholder 
involvement with the firm is pervasive and corporate goals are typically defined 
more widely than shareholders' profits. 
However, one major criticism of this theory is that sometimes it is difficult to give 
clear guidance to help managers deal with competing social purposes and 
stakeholders' benefits, and it can be difficult to have an effective mechanism to 
ensure firms perform their social obligations. In addition, Keasey et al. (1997) 
suggest that the stakeholder model is not at all in conflict with the principal-agent 
model. The reason is that if ethical behaviour is the strategy that maximises long-
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term profits, shareholders should encourage their managers to practise it. It seems 
that at least the instrumental aspect of stakeholder theory is compatible with the 
principal-agent model. 
4.2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
One of the principles in the Code requires that the board should present a balanced 
and understandable assessment of the firm's position and prospects. Balanced 
assessment could mean making more informative disclosures regarding both good 
and bad news. Therefore a firm with a high standard of corporate governance will 
make more informative disclosures. Some of the advantages of having more 
informative disclosures are larger analyst following, more accurate analysts' 
earnings forecasts and timelier price discovery (Beekes & Brown, 2006). Based 
on this I proposed these hypotheses (presented in both null and alternative forms): 
H04a: There is no relationship between firms that comply completely with 
the Code and analyst bias 
H4a: Firms that comply completely with the Code have lower analyst 
bias 
H04b: There is no relationship between firms that comply completely with 
the Code and analyst accuracy 
H4b: Firms that comply completely with the Code have higher analyst 
accuracy 
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H04c: There is no relationship between firms that comply completely with 
the Code and analyst disagreement 
H4c: Firms that comply completely with the Code have lower analyst 
disagreement 
H04d: There is no relationship between firms that comply completely with 
the Code and analyst following 
H4d: Firms that comply completely with the Code have higher analyst 
following 
Various studies have shown that strong boards of directors will monitor firm 
performance and will not be hesitant to replace the managers if the firm is 
performing poorly (Weisbach, 1988; Denis & Denis, 1995; Huson et aI., 2(04). 
Since firms that comply with the Code will have more independent directors in 
the board, the chances are that CEO turnover will be high if the firm if performing 
badly. Based on these findings I proposed this hypothesis (presented in both null 
and alternative forms): 
HaS: There is no relationship between firms that comply completely with 
the Code and CEO turnover during bad performance 
H5: Firms that comply completely with the Code have higher CEO 
turnover during bad performance 
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The Code stresses that the firm must state the potential maximum remuneration 
available to the managers including performance related elements 16• Information 
on salary and bonus is usually straight forward but not necessarily for other long 
term compensation plans especially when it involves share options. Since such 
information is not legally compulsory, firms have a choice on whether to disclose 
it or not17 . However, there is growing evidence that board composition has started 
to exercise its monitoring function and demanding more information to be 
disclosed on long term compensation plans. Conyon et a1. (2002) indicate that the 
quality of information disclosed about share options is a positive function of the 
increased presence of nonexecutive directors. Based on this finding I proposed 
this hypothesis (presented in both null and alternative forms): 
Ho6: There is no relationship between firms that comply completely with 
the Code and quality of information disclosed about long term 
compensation. 
H6: Firms that comply completely with the Code have higher quality of 
information disclosed about long term compensation. 
There are several studies in the UK trying to find whether good governance will 
leads to better firm performance and the results are generally mixed. Padgett & 
Shabbir (2005) find that compliance to the Code leads to a better share price 
return. However, MacNeil & Li (2006) discover that firms that consistently do not 
comply with the Code tend to perform better in term of share prices but Arcot & 
16 Section B.l.l and Schedule A of Combined Code of Corporate Governance 2003 
17 However, beginning 1 January 2005 all listed firms had to disclose the accounting treatment for 
all share-based payments under FRS20. 
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Bruno (2007) find that only firms which provided detailed explanation for their 
non-compliance managed to produce abnormal returns. 
In general though, most studies tend to focus on finding link between firm 
performance and specific governance mechanisms or against governance index 
created by the study itself (Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; Larcker, Richardson 
& Tuna, 2007). They find some evidence of the effect of governance mechanisms 
on firm performance (Gompers et aI., 2003; Core et aI., 2006; Larcker et aI., 2007) 
but others have found that endogeneity problem could give misleading results 
(Chid amb aran, Palia & Zheng, 2006). Based on these findings I proposed this 
hypothesis in a null form: 
Ho7: Firms that comply completely with the Code are not associated 
with firm performance 
4.3 Research Methodology 
In this section I present the regression models used in the empirical analysis and 
discuss how I measure compliance with the Code and issues related to the welfare 
of shareholders. I then discuss the control variables used in the models. 
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4.3.1 REGRESSION MODELS 
This study employs ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model for each 
hypothesis presented in the previous section and most of these models are based 
on the previous works done on the subject issues. 
4.3.1.1 Disclosure Quality Models 
The disclosure quality models are based on the works by Beekes & Brown (2006) 
which also look into firm's corporate governance and the informativeness of its 
disclosures. The model for H4a is specified as below: 
Biasj" = flo + fl1 COMi./ + fl2 Controlsi" + Gj,l (5) 
where Bias is a proxy for signed Forecast Error (FE), calculated by mean forecast 
EPS less EPS, deflated by prior share price; COM is a proxy for compliance with 
the Code; Controls are an additional determinants of the disclosure quality; € is 
the error term and i and t are firm and time subscripts respectively. 
The model for H4b is specified as below: 
Accuracyi" = flo + flo + fll COMj" + fl2 Controlsj" + Gj.1 (6) 
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where Accuracy is a proxy for absolute value of the FE, deflated by prior share 
price; COM is a proxy for compliance with the Code; Controls are an additional 
determinants of the disclosure quality; E is the error term and i and t are firm and 
time subscripts respectively. 
The model for H4c is specified as below: 
Disag~, = /30 + /30 + /31 COMi,t + /32 Controlsi,l + Ci,1 (7) 
where Disag is a proxy for level of disagreement, by calculating standard 
deviation across analysts' forecasts for that firm-month, deflated by share price; 
COM is a proxy for compliance with the Code; Controls are an additional 
determinants of the disclosure quality; E is the error term and i and t are firm and 
time subscripts respectively. 
The model for H4d is specified as below: 
Analysti,l = /30 + /30 + /31 COMi" + /32 Controlsi,1 + Ci,l (8) 
where Analyst is a proxy for number of analysts contributing to the forecast; COM 
is a proxy for compliance with the Code; Controls are an additional determinants 
of the disclosure quality; E is the error term and i and t are firm and time 
subscripts respectively. 
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Among the reasons for why each firm has a different level of disclosure of its 
financial report is due to management incentive (Noe, 1999). However, if a firm 
has strong governance, management will be required to make an optimal 
disclosure for the benefit of shareholders including the financial analyst. Such 
high quality of disclosure will therefore attract more analyst following and more 
accurate forecast on firm's performance. All the models above reflected 
contemporaneous effect since analysts are taking any changes in firm's policy and 
governance effort in a very timely manner. 
4.3.1.2 CEO Turnover Model 
The model for H5 is specified as below: 
CEOResignl.t = {30 + {3] NEG 41 -1 + {32 COM/,I_I + {33 NEG/,I_] • COMi,I_I + {34 
Controlsl,t + £:I,t (9) 
where CEOResign is a dummy variable coded 1 if CEO resigns and 0 otherwise; 
NEG is a proxy for dummy variable coded 1 if returns are negative and 0 
otherwise; COM is a proxy for compliance with the Code; Controls are an 
additional determinants of the CEO turnover; I: is the error term and i and tare 
firm and time subscripts respectively. 
Board of directors have responsibility to monitor and evaluate management. If the 
management did not perform according to board expectation, the board has a right 
to replace the management with the new one especially the CEO of the firm. Since 
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evaluation of the management is usually based on firm prior performance, the 
model incorporated lagged variables. 
4.3.1.3 Compensation Disclosure Quality Model 
The compensation disclosure quality model is based on the works by Conyon et 
al. (2002) which look into disclosures of directors' share option information in 
UK firms. The model for H6 is specified as below: 
CDQi,/ = /30 + /31 COMi,/ + /32 Controlsi,/ + Gi,/ (10) 
where CDQ is a proxy for compensation disclosure quality, measured by 
percentage of long term compensation plan disclosed without information on its 
performance scale and comparator; COM is a proxy for compliance with the 
Code; Controls is an additional determinants of the compensation disclosure 
quality; E is the error term and i and tare ftrm and time subscripts respectively. 
One of the positive impacts of having larger number of independent directors is 
that they will require more information regarding management compensation to 
be disclosed for the benefits of shareholders. This is hoped will reduce the 
opportunity by the management to engage in any earnings management especially 
if their compensations are depending on firm's performance. Therefore, if the 
board insists on greater transparency management will have to produce all 
information available regarding disclosure of compensation policy. 
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4.3.1.4 Firm Performance Model 
The firm performance model is based on the works by Core et al. (2006) who 
investigate whether weak corporate governance causes poor stock returns. The 
model for H07 is specified as below: 
ROA i,l = /30 + /31 COMi.I _1 + /32 Controlsi,l_l + E:~I (11) 
where ROA is a proxy for future operating income over year-end total assets; 
COM is a proxy for compliance with the Code; Controls are an additional 
determinants of the firm performance; E is the error term and i and t are firm and 
time subscripts respectively. Since we are looking into a direct effect of 
governance towards firm performance, the model is presented using the lagged 
variables, 
As mentioned earlier, there is a potential endogeneity issue in relation to the link 
between corporate governance and firm performance (Chidambaran et aI., 2006). 
Standard linear regression models assume that errors in the dependent variables 
are uncorrelated with the independent variables, meaning that relationships 
between these variables are not bidirectional. However, sometimes this is not the 
case with governance and firm performance where some studies suggested that 
performance can have an effect on governance. Therefore in this case, OLS 
regression can no longer provides optimal model estimates. To address this I will 
use a two-stage least squares regression method which uses instrumental variables 
that are uncorrelated with the error terms to compute estimated values of the 
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problematic variable (the first stage), and then uses those computed values to 
estimate a linear regression model of the dependent variable (the second stage). 
Since the computed values are based on variables that are uncorrelated with the 
errors, the results of the two-stage model are optimal. 
4.3.2 MEASUREMENTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE 
Previously, study on the compliance level of the Code had to rely on self-
constructed index (Padgett & Shabbir, 2005; Arcot & Bruno, 2007) and survey 
(MacNeil & Li, 2006) since such data is not available publicly in any database or 
publication. However, since 2002, Grant Thornton UK LLP has started to review 
and publish annual study on the level of compliance for FTSE 350 companies. 
Through series of discussion, they have agreed to provide me with their raw data 
for the year 2003 until 2007. Grant Thornton has their own compliance index and 
I have included their index in my study together with the amended index to 
incorporate more stringent requirements to link relationship between compliance 
with the Code and various issues studied. 
In order to measure compliance rate, I will follow the same levels of measurement 
stated in Chapter Four, starting from a basic measurement to a more refined 
measurement. The first level is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm announces in 
their annual report that they fully comply with the Code, 0 otherwise. The second 
level is a continuous variable where percentage of compliance to the Code is 
measured using Grant Thornton questionnaire method (20 questions based on the 
principles in the Code). I decided to refine this index further by introducing third 
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level of measurement because some of the questions posed by Grant Thornton are 
merely informational in nature and not really promoting the true objectives of the 
Cade1S. Therefore I created several compliance indexes that consist of 
requirements that truly promote corporate governance. Each index will be 
modified to correspond to specific issues because many studies have argued that 
there is no one 'best' measure of corporate governance since it needs to look into 
the context of the specific issue and firm's specific circumstances (Arcot & 
Bruno, 2007; Bhagat, Bolton & Romano, 2007). 
Therefore, CEO turnover model will use a compliance index based on four 
questions from Grant Thornton index only. Disclosure quality and firm 
performance models will also use these four questions and three questions on 
audit committee. Compensation disclosure quality model will have additional two 
questions on remuneration committee. Table 4.1 listed these revised questions. 
4.3.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
4.3.3.1 Control Variables for Disclosure Quality Models 
The first two models will use two control variables. The first variable is Size as a 
proxy for firm size, (natural log of the firm's market capitalisation) since large 
firms are subject to greater public scrutiny and are therefore likely to disclose 
more frequently. The second variable Analyst is a proxy for number of analysts 
contributing to the forecast. 
18 For example, one of the questions asked by Grant Thornton is whether the terms and conditions 
of appointment of non-executive directors are available for inspection. 
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In the third and fourth models, both will be using the same three control 
variables.; Size is a proxy for firm size, calculated as a natural log of the firm·s 
market capitalisation on the forecast cut-off date; FE is a proxy for forecast EPS 
minus actual EPS over the share price, for the same firm and same forecast 
horizon; ABSFE is a proxy for absolute value of FE; 
4.3.3.2 Control Variables for CEO Turnover Model 
The CEO turnover model will have three control variables: Size is a proxy for firm 
size, measured by natural log of the firm's market capitalisation; OwnDir is a 
proxy for total shares held by executive directors over the total number of shares 
outstanding and OwnBlock is a proxy for dummy variable coded 1 if at least one 
external shareholders holds more than 10% of outstanding equity and 0 otherwise. 
4.3.3.3 Control Variables for Compensation Disclosure Quality Model 
The compensation disclosure quality model has six control variables. Size is a 
proxy for firm size, measured by natural log of the firm's market capitalisation. It 
is argued that larger firms will be more visible and they will attract greater 
disclosure costs, thereby reducing its disclosure (Forker, 1992). OwnDir is a 
proxy for total shares held by executive directors over the total number of shares 
outstanding and OwnBlock is a proxy for dummy variable coded 1 if at least one 
external shareholder holds more than 10% of outstanding equity and 0 otherwise. 
ROA is a proxy for future operating income over year-end total assets. This 
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control variable is a bit similar to Size in a sense that a successful firm will be 
reluctant to disclose more information on their compensation information as this 
will give their rivals to emulate their proven rewards structure. Salary is a proxy 
for component of compensation that is fixed at the beginning of the year; Cash is 
a proxy for the sum of salary and annual bonus. 
4.3.3.4 Control Variables for Firm Performance Model 
The firm performance models will have five control variables: Size is a proxy for 
firm size, measured as natural log of the firm's market capitalisation. Fama & 
French (1992) found negative relationship between firm size (measured by market 
equity) and average return which is confirmed again by Weir, Laing & McKnight 
(2002) even when its proxy is sales. OwnDir is a proxy for total shares held by 
executive directors over total number of shares outstanding and OwnBlock is a 
proxy for dummy variable coded 1 if at least one external stakeholder holds more 
than 10% of outstanding equity and 0 otherwise. Schleifer and Vishny (1986) and 
Leech and Leahy (1991) found a positive relationship between external 
shareholders and firm performance. However, in the current studies, there is little 
evidence of relationship between block holding and firm performance (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996; Short and Keasey, 1999; Weir et aI., 2002; Gillan, Hartzell 
and Starks, 2003) with an exception of study by Bohren and Odegaard (2003) on 
the Norwegian firms. 
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4.4 Sample, Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
4.4.1 SAMPLE SELECfION 
As with the previous chapter, the initial sample of firms used for this study is 
based on the FTSE 350 UK firms (excluding financial and utility firms) for each 
year from 2003 until 2007. These firms were selected because they were in the 
Grant Thornton Annual FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review (2004 - 2(07) 
to which Grant Thornton UK LLP has agreed to provide their raw data to me to 
analyse further for the purpose of this study. 
From the initial set of sample from Grant Thornton, several firms were omitted for 
the reasons such as firms that have been undergoing acquisition, merger, demerger 
and being delisted from the stock exchange as their data is no longer available in 
the database. Since the number of firms in the sample has been slightly changed, I 
have adjusted the compliance rate to the Code which has been reported earlier by 
Grant Thornton using their original sample. Table 4.2 shows all the changes in 
Grant Thornton sample. 
4.4.2 DATA 
As with the previous chapter, compliance with the Code data is obtained from the 
Grant Thornton Annual FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review raw data for 
each year from 2003 until 2007. This raw data consists of survey information on 
each individual firm in the FTSE 350. The survey questions are driven directly 
from the Code provisions and Turnbull guidance and are created to reflect the 
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'best practice' as perceived by the Code. The survey is completed by reading the 
hard copies of each firm's annual report and accounts, focusing on the front half 
of the report (i.e. not the accounts) including the sections; Business Review, 
Corporate Responsibility, Corporate Governance and Remuneration Report. 
The financial data are obtained from Worldscope and FAME database. Numbers 
of analysts following the firms and forecasts for EPS are obtained from I/B/E/S 
database. Shareholders ownership structure is obtained from Waterlow Stock 
Exchange Yearbook. This data is hand collected from the ownership structure 
report section of the corresponding firm's published annual report and accounts. 
Management compensation, management share ownership data and information 
on resignation of CEO will be obtained from Manifest database. 
4.4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4.3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for 
H4a to H4b. Panel A of Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics for sample 
used in the H4a and H4b models. Mean for Bias is -0.004 with a standard 
deviation of 0.013. This is quite low than what has been obtained by Beekes and 
Brown (2006) where they have a mean of 0.057 and a standard deviation of 0.2. 
Mean for Accuracy is 0.007 with a standard deviation of 0.012. Again this is 
lower than mean of 0.069 in the sample obtained by Beekes and Brown (2006). 
Possible reason for lower mean for both Bias and Accuracy is because my sample 
focused on top 350 firms in the UK which command high profile and better 
scrutiny by the analysts compared to Beekes and Brown (2006) study that only 
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look into 250 Australian firms. Mean for ClaimFull]9 is 0.391 with a standard 
deviation of 0.488 and skewness of 0.447. Mean for Comp2c1° is 0.809 with a 
standard deviation of 0.148. Mean for Comp72 ] is 0.775 with a standard deviation 
of 0.188. Mean for Analyst is 9.067 with a standard deviation of 5.312 and this is 
on par with what Beekes and Brown (2006) have in their sample with a mean of 
9.59 for analyst following. 
Panel B of Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used in the H4c 
model. Mean for Disag is 0.004 with a standard deviation of 0.07. This is slightly 
lower than with Beekes and Brown (2006) study where they found a mean of 0.01 
and a standard deviation of 0.01. Mean for ClaimFull is 0.374 with a standard 
deviation of 0.484 and skewness of 0.523. Mean for Comp20 is 0.781 with a 
standard deviation of 0.157. Mean for Comp7 is 0.757 with a standard deviation 
of 0.19. Mean for FEMean is -0.005 with a standard deviation of 0.015. Mean for 
ABSFEMean is 0.008 with a standard deviation of 0.013. These are slightly lower 
than what Beekes and Brown (2006) reported in the sample where they obtained a 
mean of 0.020 and 0.0359 for FEMean and ABSFEMean respectively. Panel C of 
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used in the H4d model. 
Mean for Analyst is 8.66 with a standard deviation of 5.44 and a skewness of 0.78. 
Mean for ClaimFull is 0.39 with a standard deviation of 0.49 and skewness of 
0.46. Mean for Comp20 is 0.80 with a standard deviation of 0.15. Mean for 
Comp7 is 0.77 with a standard deviation of 0.19. 
19 ClaimFull is a dummy variable for firms claiming full compliance with the Code with 1 
indicates claim of full compliance and 0 otherwise. 
20 Comp20 is a compliance variable for number of criteria fulfilled by the firms out of 20 set of 
~uestions set by Grant Thornton to determine full compliance with the Code. . 
2 Comp7 is a compliance variable for number of criteria fulfilled by the firms out of a specIfic .set 
of 4 questions relating to most basic and important principles in the Code and 3 questions relatmg 
to audit committee. 
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Table 4.4 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for H5 
to Ha7. Panel A of Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used in 
the CEO turnover model. Mean for CEO Turnover is 0.14 with a standard 
deviation of 0.35. This is on par with what Huson et a1. (2004) found in their 
study on 1344 US CEOs from 1971 to 1994. They found a mean of 0.16 for CEO 
that was forced to resign. Mean for ClaimFull is 0.40 with a standard deviation of 
0.49 and skewness of 0.47. Mean for Comp20 is 0.80 with a standard deviation of 
0.15. Mean for Comp422 is 0.76 with a standard deviation of 0.23. 
Panel B of Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used in the 
compensation disclosure quality model. Mean for CDQ is 0.87 with a standard 
deviation of 0.20. Mean for ClaimFull is 0.42 with a standard deviation of 0.49 
and skewness of 0.35. Mean for Comp20 is 0.79 with a standard deviation of 0.15. 
Mean for Comp9 is 0.78 with a standard deviation of 0.18. Panel C of Table 4.4 
presents the descriptive statistics for sample used in the firm performance model. 
Mean for ROA is 0.47 with a standard deviation of 0.44. Mean for ClaimFull is 
0.39 with a standard deviation of 0.49 and skewness of 0.45. Mean for Comp20 is 
0.79 with a standard deviation of 0.16. Mean for Comp7 is 0.75 with a standard 
deviation of 0.20. 
In addition of looking into the skewness of the data, Q-Q plots have been 
employed to check the deviations of the data from the normal distribution. Q-Q 
22 Comp4 is a compliance variable for number of criteria fulfilled by the firms out of a specific set 
of 4 questions relating to most basic and important principles in the Code. 
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plots for H4a, H4b, H4c, H4d, H5, H6 and Ho7 are presented in the Appendix D, 
E, F, G, H, I and J respectively. 
4.5 Analysis 
This section examines the relation between compliance with the Code and various 
issues related to the welfare of shareholders such as disclosure quality, CEO 
turnover, compensation disclosure quality and fIrm performance of FTSE 350 UK 
firms from 2003 until 2007. I report the main regression results in the next 
section. 
4.5.1 RESULTS 
Table 4.5 reports coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for OLS 
regression on H4a and H4b. I could not find any significant relationship between 
compliance with the Code and analyst bias and accuracy using the ClaimFull and 
Comp20 compliance variables. However, when using Comp7 as a compliance 
variable, I found a significant negative relationship between compliance with the 
Code and analyst bias. This is consistent with the findings by Beekes and Brown 
(2006) which also produced a significant negative relationship between analyst 
bias and corporate governance quality. However, I also found a significant 
positive relationship between compliance with the Code and analyst accuracy. 
This is in contrast with earlier findings by Beekes and Brown (2006) and warrants 
further investigation. The fact that these regression results produce low adjusted r-
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square could explain this anomaly and could be better improved by including 
more related variables. 
Panel A of Table 4.6 reports coefficient estimates and model summary statistics 
for OLS regression on H4c. I could not find any significant relationship between 
compliance with the Code and analyst disagreement. However both Size and 
ABSMean are significantly related to analyst disagreement. Never the less under 
Comp7 compliance variables I found that its p-value is the lowest (0.127) than the 
other two compliance variables. Panel B of Table 4.6 reports coefficient estimates 
and model summary statistics for OLS regression on H4d. I found a significant 
positive relationship between compliance with the Code and analyst following. 
Size and ABSFEMean also show significant relationships with analyst following. 
This is consistent with findings by Beekes and Brown (2006) which also found 
significant positive relationship between corporate governance quality and analyst 
following. A high adjusted r-square also indicates that this model explains a 
reasonable amount of cross-sectional variation in analyst following. All models 
under H4 are also tested using median instead of mean for measuring Bias, 
Accuracy and other control variables and the results still indicate the same 
outcome. 
Table 4.7 reports coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for binary 
logistic regression on H5. I found no significant relationship between compliance 
with the Code and CEO turnover. This shows that the event where CEO resigns or 
being forced to resign is not associated with the fact whether the firm is fully in 
compliance with the Code or not. This is possibly due to a fact that investors 
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would rather based their decision whether to retain their CEO on the basis of 
financial perform as being proposed by Huson et al. (2004). The firm's decision to 
comply or not with the Code seems irrelevant in the eyes of their investors when 
coming into the arguments on retaining or forcing the resignation of their CEO. 
Coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for OLS regression on H6 is 
presented in Table 4.8. I found no significant relationship between two 
compliance variables (ClaimFuli and Comp9) and compensation disclosure 
quality. However I found a significant negative relationship between 
compensation disclosure quality and Comp20, which is the set of criteria used by 
Grant Thornton to define full compliance with the Code. At a first glance, this 
looks odd as influential shareholders might be demanding more information to be 
disclosed on long term compensation plans. On the other hand though, this looks 
like they are compensating such deficiency of information on their long term 
compensation plans by complying fully with the Code, hopefully to pacify the 
increasing demands and monitoring by their shareholders. 
Table 4.9 reports coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for two-stage 
least squares regression on Ho7. I found some interesting finding on this model. It 
seems that under ClaimFull compliance variables, it shows a significant negative 
relationship with firm performance. Both OwnDir and OwnBlock also have 
significant negative relationship with firm performance. However, no significant 
relationship was found between the other two compliance variables and firm 
performance. As we recall, ClaimFull variable is a dummy variable with value of 
1 if the firm claims in their annual report that they are in full compliance with the 
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Code and 0 otherwise. However, Grant Thornton argued that only very small 
percentage of these firms actually fully complied with the principles of the Code. 
Could this negative relationship between ClaimFull and ROA simply suggest that 
the firms are trying to mask their underperformance by making claim that they 
have done their best efforts which include fully complying with the Code'? This 
result suggests similarity with MacNeil & Li (2006) findings which discover that 
firms that consistently do not comply with the Code tend to perform better in term 
of share prices. However, low adjusted r-square warrants caution and further 
investigation into this result. The summary table for outcomes for all hypotheses 
is presented in Table 4.10. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the relationship between compliance with the Code and 
issues related to the welfare of shareholders such as disclosure quality, CEO 
turnover, compensation disclosure quality and firm performance. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, many studies in the UK and the US have look into 
relationship between these issues and various measurements of corporate 
governance but none of them has used compliance with the Code as a determinant 
governance factor with an exception of looking into a relationship with firm 
performance. Even then these UK studies found conflicting results and could not 
reach a consensus whether compliance with the Code will improve firm 
performance or not. This is crucial because full compliance with the Code has 
been mentioned by FRS to be helpful for investors in making their decision and 
can help firms perform better. However, findings by Grant Thornton shows that 
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less than half of FTSE 350 firms can claim full compliance with the Code and this 
is in contrast with FRS objective. Therefore this chapter adds to current literature 
by providing a UK perspective on the measurements of corporate governance and 
what impact it has on various issues on the welfare of shareholders. 
Four issues were examined and seven hypotheses were tested. I find that firms 
that comply with the crucial principles in the Code have lower analyst bias and 
increase analyst following. I also find that there is no relationship between 
compliance with the Code and CEO turnover. There is some evidence of 
compliance with the Code affects compensation disclosure quality. There is also 
some evidence that firms are trying to mask their underperformance by claiming 
full compliance with the Code in their annual report. 
Limitations of the analysis are as follows. As with the previous chapter, this 
chapter only deals with a specific model to analyse the relationship between each 
issue and compliance with the Code. By including more models and alternatives 
in measuring the crucial variables, better and comprehensive results could be 
obtained to better understand these relationships. 
For examples, I could introduce another model to analyse the relationship between 
disclosure quality and compliance with the Code. Beekes and Brown (2006) look 
into timeliness model where they found that firms with high governance quality 
will make more balanced and timelier disclosures. I could also look further into 
reasons why CEOs resign from their position because according to Huson et al. 
(2004) most of the events surrounding CEO turnover could be divided into two 
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types; CEO being forced to resign and CEO voluntarily resigns. In term of 
measuring compensation disclosure quality, I could try to determine whether there 
is enough information provided by the firms for the investors and shareholders to 
calculate and estimate the potential payoffs from these long term compensation 
plan. Results from firm performance model shows some promise and perhaps I 
could expand it further by including more firm performance measurements and 
other control variables that can better explain the variations in the model. Future 
research could employ this alternative models and measurements to better capture 
the relationship between various issues of welfare of shareholders and compliance 
with the Code. 
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TABLE 4.1 
eVlse OTrlQI wnce n R de t Id ex 
No. Questions Issues Categories 
1 Led by the senior independent, do the CEO turnover, Non-Executive 
non-executive directors meet without disclosure quality, Directors 
the chairman at least annually to firm performance, 
appraise the chairman's performance? compensation 
disclosure quali~ 
2 Is at least half of the board comprised CEO turnover, Non-Executive 
of independent non-executive disclosure quality, Directors 
directors? firm performance, 
compensation 
disclosure_qualitr 
3 Are the roles of the chairman and chief CEO turnover, Board and 
executive exercised by the same disclosure quality, Committees 
individual? firm performance, 
compensation 
disclosureJluali!y 
4 Are the majority of nomination CEO turnover, Nomination 
committee members NEDs and is the disclosure quality, Committee 
chairman either chairman of the board firm performance, 
or a NED? compensation 
disclosure quali!y 
5 Does the company state the potential Compensation Remuneration 
maximum remuneration available disclosure quality Committee 
including performance related 
elements? 
6 Are there at least three remuneration Compensation Remuneration 
committee members, all of whom are disclosure quality Committee 
independent NEDs? 
7 Are all the audit committee members Disclosure quality, Audit Committee 
independent NEDs? firm performance, 
compensation 
disclosureJluali!y 
8 Does the audit committee monitor and Disclosure quality, Audit Committee 
review the effectiveness of internal firm performance, 
audit activities? compensation 
disclosure _quali~ 
9 Do they have an internal audit function Disclosure quality, Audit Committee 
or equivalent? firm performance, 
compensation 
disclosure quality 
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TABLE 4.2 
Sample Selection Filters 
Year 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
No. of sample from Grant n/a 315 320 314 306 
Thornton Review 
No. of sample after 267 312 306 275 95 
redistribution according to end 
of financial year 
less Takover, delisted and others 107 97 74 28 16 
Final Sample 160 215 232 247 79 
Claim of full compliance rate 
from Grant Thornton Review 
n/a 57.80% 27.60% 34.10% 40.80% 
Claim of full compliance rate 53.75% 39.53% 27.59% 43.32% 40.51 % 
from Final Sample 
The table presents a breakdown of the sample selection process. The initial sample 
of firms consisted of firms included in Grant Thornton raw data. Details of 
reasons for omission are presented, together with the final sample and revised 
compliance rate. 
Note: Table 4.2 is similar with Table 3.3 
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TABLE 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics for H4 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for H4a and H4b 
N min max mean stdev 
Bias 652 -0.091 0.058 -0.004 0.013 
Accuracy 652 0.000 0.091 0.007 0.012 
Cia imFu II 652 0 1 0.391 0.488 
Comp20 652 0.150 1 0.809 0.148 
Comp7 652 0.143 1 0.775 0.188 
Size 650 11.513 25.403 21.259 1.352 
Analyst 652 1 27 9.067 5.312 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for H4c 
N min max mean stdev 
Disag 452 0.000 0.050 0.004 0.006 
ClaimFull 452 0 1 0.374 0.484 
Comp20 452 0.150 1 0.781 0.157 
Comp7 452 0.143 1 0.757 0.190 
Size 452 11.513 25.384 21.244 1.386 
FEMean 452 -0.091 0.058 -0.005 0.015 
ABSFEMean 452 0.000 0.091 0.008 0.013 
FEMedian 452 -0.093 0.059 -0.005 0.015 
ABSFEMedian 452 0.000 0.093 0.008 0.013 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for H4d 
N min max mean stdev 
NoAnalysts 683 1 27 8.67 5.46 
CIa imFu II 683 0 1 0.39 0.49 
Comp20 683 0.15 1 0.80 0.15 
Comp7 683 0 1 0.77 0.19 
Size 683 11.51 25.40 21.20 1.35 
skew kurt 
-1.498 10.219 
3.113 11.426 
0.447 -1.805 
-1.144 1.488 
-0.786 0.289 
0.250 4.672 
0.814 0.268 
skew kurt 
4.022 23.311 
0.523 -1.734 
-0.995 1.009 
-0.742 0.297 
0.018 5.765 
-1.107 7.451 
2.653 8.028 
-1.204 7.710 
2.694 8.374 
skew kurt 
0.78 0.21 
0.47 -1.79 
-1.11 1.29 
-0.85 0.53 
0.31 4.38 
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FEMean 
ABSFEMean 
FEMed 
ABSFEMed 
683 
683 
683 
683 
-0.14 
0.00 
-0.13 
0.00 
0.06 
0.14 
0.06 
0.13 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
-2.34 18.22 
3.90 22.86 
-2.27 16.71 
3.76 20.61 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for disclosure quality models. Panel A 
presents the statistics for all the variables used in H4a and H4b model, Panel B 
presents the statistics for all the variables used in H4c model and Panel C presents 
the statistics for all the variables used in H4d model. 
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TABLE 4.4 
Descriptive Statistics for H5, H6 and Ha7 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for H5. 
N min max mean stdev 
CEO Turnover 708 0 1 0.14 0.35 
ClaimFuli 709 0 1 0.40 0.49 
Comp2O 709 0.15 1 0.80 0.15 
Comp4 709 0 1 0.76 0.23 
NEG 709 0 1 0.17 0.37 
Size 707 11.51 25.40 21.30 1.38 
OwnDir 709 0 0.88 0.03 0.11 
OwnB10 ck 709 0 1 0.48 0.50 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for H6. 
N min max mean stdev 
CDQ 453 0 1 0.87 0.20 
ClaimFull 453 0 1 0.42 0.49 
Comp2O 453 0.15 1 0.79 0.15 
Comp9 453 0.11 1 0.78 0.18 
Salary 453 11.69 14.16 13.02 0.42 
Cash 453 12.17 15.34 13.40 0.62 
Size 453 19.04 24.77 21.11 1.18 
OwnDir 453 0 0.88 0.04 0.12 
OwnB10 ck 453 0 1 0.52 0.50 
ROA 453 -1.00 0.98 0.21 0.39 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for Ho7. 
N min max mean stdev 
ROA 611 -1.30 1.98 0.47 0.44 
ClaimFull 611 0 1 0.39 0.49 
Comp2O 611 0.15 1 0.79 0.16 
skew kurt 
2.03 2.13 
0.39 -1.85 
-1.13 1.37 
-0.66 -0.30 
1.78 1.18 
0.21 3.74 
4.54 22.95 
0.10 -2.00 
skew kurt 
-1.79 3.50 
0.35 -1.89 
-0.87 0.63 
-0.92 0.81 
-0.03 -0.21 
0.56 0.16 
0.82 0.18 
4.39 21.37 
-0.09 -2.00 
-0.92 0.90 
skew kurt 
0.73 2.00 
0.45 -1.81 
-1.13 1.28 
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Comp7 
Size 
OwnDir 
OwnBlock 
611 
611 
611 
611 
o 
11.51 
0.00 
o 
1 
25.53 
0.88 
1 
0.75 
21.09 
0.04 
0.52 
0.20 
1.35 
0.13 
0.50 
-0.81 
0.28 
3.64 
-0.07 
0.33 
4.76 
13.68 
-2.00 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for CEO turnover, compensation 
disclosure quality and firm performance models. Panel A presents the statistics for 
all the variables used in CEO turnover model, Panel B presents the statistics for 
all the variables used in compensation disclosure quality model and Panel C 
presents the statistics for all the variables used in firm performance model. 
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TABLE 4.5 
OLS Regression Results for H4a and H4b 
Panel A: OLS Regression results for H4a 
Independent variables Bias (mean) Bias (median) 
est. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co-eff. F-value p-value 
Intercept -0.067 -0.964 0.335 -0.053 -0.832 0.406 
Y2003 -0.008 -0.637 0.525 -0.003 -0.213 0.831 
Y2004 -0.032 -2.802 0.005 -0.032 -2.955 0.003 
Y2005 -0.009 -0.852 0.394 -0.007 -0.731 0.465 
Y2007 0.000 -0.031 0.975 -0.001 -0.067 0.947 
Size 0.005 1.375 0.169 0.004 1.215 0.225 
Analyst 0.000 -0.165 0.869 0.000 -0.047 0.963 
Comp7 -0.045 -1.961 0.050 -0.040 -1.876 0.061 
R Square 0.0182 0.0202 
Adjusted R Square 0.0076 0.0096 
112 
Panel B: OLS Regression results for H4b 
Independent variables Accuracy (mean) Accuracy (median) 
F- F-
est. co-eff. value p-value est. co-eff. value p-value 
Intercept 0.076 1.108 0.268 0.061 0.955 0.340 
Y2OO3 0.017 1.363 0.173 0.011 0.961 0.337 
Y2OO4 0.034 2.946 0.003 0.033 3.073 0.002 
Y2OO5 0.009 0.842 0.400 0.007 0.741 0.459 
Y2OO7 0.000 -0.026 0.979 0.000 -0.012 0.991 
Size -0.005 -1.573 0.116 -0.005 -1.389 0.165 
Analyst 0.000 0.024 0.981 0.000 -0.087 0.931 
Camp7 0.056 2.464 0.014 0.050 2.366 0.Ql8 
R Square 0.0225 0.0230 
Adjusted R Square 0.0119 0.0124 
This table presents the OLS regression results with its estimated co-efficients and 
its p values. Panel A presents the OLS regression results for H4a and Panel B 
presents the OLS regression results for H4b. 
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TABLE 4.6 
OLS Regression Results for H4c and H4d 
Panel A: OLS Regression results for H4c 
Independent variables ClaimFull Comp20 Comp7 
F- F- F-
est. co-eff. value p-value est. co-eff. value p-value est. co-eff. value p-value 
Intercept 0.009 2.426 0.016 0.010 2.571 0.010 0.010 2.687 0.007 
Y2003 0.001 1.049 0.295 0.001 0.823 0.411 0.001 1.159 0.247 
Y2004 -0.001 0.807 0.420 -0.001 0.839 0.402 0.000 0.587 0.558 
Y2007 0.000 0.096 0.923 0.000 0.045 0.964 0.000 0.028 0.978 
Compliance variables 0.000 0.853 0.394 0.000 0.046 0.963 0.002 1.530 0.127 
Size 0.000 1.666 0.096 0.000 1.750 0.081 0.000 2.269 0.024 
FEMean -0.010 0.503 0.615 -0.009 0.454 0.650 -0.010 0.483 0.629 
ABSFEMean 0.195 8.510 0.000 0.195 8.480 0.000 0.192 8.371 0.000 
R Square 0.2017 0.2004 0.2046 
Adjusted R Square 0.1892 0.1878 0.1921 
Panel B: OLS Regression results for H4d 
Independent variables CIDimFull Comp20 Comp7 
est. co-eff. F-value p-value esl. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co-eff. F-value p-value 
Inlercepl -33.733 -12.537 0.000 -34.551 -12.879 0.000 -33.565 -12.583 0.000 
Y2003 -2.270 4.230 0.000 -1.741 -2.902 0.004 -1.882 -3A83 0.001 
Y2004 -2A71 -5.007 0.000 -2203 4.197 0.000 -2.146 4.272 0.000 
Y2005 0.042 0.091 0.928 0.031 0.068 0.945 0.029 0.064 0.949 
Y2007 1.345 1.999 0.046 1.315 1.955 0.051 1.347 2.014 0.044 
Compliance variables 0.598 1.688 0.092 2.273 1.674 0.095 3.097 3.268 0.001 
Size 2.040 16.149 0.000 1.997 15.025 0.000 1.925 14.583 0.000 
FEMean 6.400 0.429 0.668 6.405 0.430 0.668 5.394 0.364 0.716 
ABSFEMean -34.853 -2.056 0.040 -35.712 -2.104 0.036 -38.330 -2.268 0.024 
RSquare 0.3653 0.3652 0.3725 
Adjusted R Square 0.3578 0.3577 0.3651 
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This table presents the OLS regression results with its estimated co-efficients and 
its p values. Panel A presents the OLS regression results for H4c and Panel B 
presents the OLS regression results for H4d. 
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TABLE 4.7 
Logit Regression Results for H5 
Independent 
variables ClaimFull Comp20 Comp4 
p- est. co- p- est. co- p-
est. co-eff. value eff. value eff. value 
Intercept -1.211 0.001 -1.413 0.116 -1.440 0.Q17 
Y2003 -1.034 0.028 -1.088 0.029 -1.164 0.016 
Y2004 -0.513 0.198 -0.511 0.214 -0.527 0.200 
Y2005 -0.418 0.285 -0.394 0.311 -0.404 0.301 
Y2006 -0.527 0.175 -0.569 0.142 -0.560 0.148 
Compliance 
variables -0.255 0.320 0.117 0.903 0.195 0.736 
NEG 0.270 0.425 0.153 0.921 1.520 0.084 
Compliance by 
NEG -0.544 0.408 -0.039 0.983 -1.894 0.101 
Size 0.000 0.678 0.000 0.762 0.000 0.721 
OwnDir -0.768 0.481 -0.623 0.570 -0.837 0.450 
OwnBlock 0.035 0.874 0.080 0.716 0.051 0.820 
F value 0.9470 0.6700 0.9530 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 0.0136 0.0097 0.0135 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 0.0243 0.0172 0.0242 
This table presents the logit regression results with its estimated co-efficients and 
its p values for H5. 
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TABLE 4.8 
OLS Regression Results for H6 
ClaimFull Comp20 Comp9 
Independent variables 
F- F- F-
est. co-eff. value p-value est. co-eff. value p-value est. co-eff. value p-value 
Intercept 0.558 1.795 0.073 0.481 1.547 0.123 0.432 1.362 0.174 
Y2003 -0.005 0.160 0.873 -0.028 0.784 0.433 0.002 0.059 0.953 
Y2005 -0.014 0.512 0.609 -0.013 0.448 0.654 -0.007 0.269 0.788 
Y2006 -0.004 0.132 0.895 -0.013 0.487 0.626 0.006 0.202 0.840 
Y2007 0.051 1.322 0.187 0.059 1.566 0.118 0.063 1.587 0.113 
Salary 0.068 1.869 0.062 0.078 2.152 0.032 0.080 2.183 0.030 
Cash -0.028 1.116 0.265 -0.030 1.180 0.238 -0.031 1.228 0.220 
Size -0.008 0.671 0.502 -0.004 0.310 0.757 -0.005 0.393 0.695 
OwnDir 0.021 0.269 0.788 -0.018 0.219 0.827 -0.010 0.127 0.899 
OwnBlock -0.042 2.249 0.025 -0.041 2.184 0.030 -0.042 2.240 0.026 
ROA 0.013 0.515 0.607 0.013 0.520 0.604 0.014 0.565 0.572 
Compliance variables 0.012 0.609 0.543 -0.153 1.921 0.055 -0.092 1.551 0.122 
R Square 0.0303 0.0375 0.0347 
Adjusted R Square 0.0061 0.0135 0.0107 
This table presents the two-stage least squares regression results with its estimated 
co-efficients and its p values for H6. 
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TABLE 4.9 
Two-stage Least Squares Regression Results for Ho7 
Independent variables ClaimFull Comp20 Comp7 
est. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co .. fL F-wlue p-wlu. 
Intercept 0.334 1.156 0.248 0.369 1272 0.204 0328 l.i23 0.262 
Compliance variables -0.063 -1.725 0.085 0.136 1.140 0.255 ~.064 -0.665 0506 
Size 0.010 0.730 0.466 0.002 0.128 0.899 0.011 0.779 0.436 
OwnDir -0226 -1.668 0.096 -0.187 -1.370 0.171 ~.223 -1.621 0.105 
OwnBlocJc -0.076 -2.095 0.037 -0.Q73 -2.031 0.043 ~.073 -2.014 0.Q44 
RSquare 0.0169 0.0142 0.0128 
Adjusted R Square O.oJ04 0.0076 0.0062 
This table presents the two-stage least squares regression results with its estimated 
co-efficients and its p values for Ho7. 
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TABLE 4.10 
Summary of outcomes for all hypotheses 
Hypothesis Hypotheses Outcomes 
No. 
H4a Firms that comply completely with the Partly fail to reject 
Code have lower analyst bias H04a, there is a 
significant negative 
relationship between 
compliance with major 
principles of the Code 
and analyst bias 
H4b Firms that comply completely with the Partly fail to reject 
Code have higher analyst accuracy H 04b, there is a 
significant positive 
relationship between 
compliance with major 
principles of the Code 
and analyst bias 
H4c Firms that comply completely with the Fail to reject H04c 
Code have lower analyst disagreement 
H4d Firms that comply completely with the Reject H04d, there is a 
Code have higher analyst following significant positive 
relationship between 
compliance and analyst 
following 
H5 Firms that comply completely with the Fail to reject Ha5 
Code have higher CEO turnover during 
bad performance 
H6 Firms that comply completely with the Partly fail to reject 
Code have higher quality of information H 06, there is a 
disclosed about long term compensation significant negative 
relationship between 
compliance with 
majority principles of 
the Code and disclosure 
of long term 
compensation 
Ha7 Firms that comply completely with the Reject Ha7, there is a 
Code are not associated with firm significant negative 
performance relationship between 
compliance and firm 
performance 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE AND MEDIA CRITICISM 
5.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the relationship between compliance with the Code and 
media criticism. Earlier studies have investigated media criticism relation with 
firm performance and various governance mechanisms but none has so far tried to 
look into the link with compliance with the Code. My analysis is motivated by the 
theoretical perspective such as political cost theory where firms with high political 
visibility will usually attract the attention of external parties such as media. 
This analysis is based on data for FfSE 350 UK firms from 2003 until 2007. I 
measure compliance with the Code by using compliance index created by Grant 
Thornton and also a revised index which specifically caters to specific issues 
addressed. The measurements for media criticism were based on prior studies that 
look into their relationship with other corporate governance mechanisms. 
For the first hypothesis, I could not find any significant relationship between 
compliance with the Code and number of news report using both levels of 
compliance variables. However, I do found a significant positive relationship 
between number of news reported and firm size under both high rate of 
compliance with the Code models and a significant negative relationship between 
number of news reported and firm performance under high rate of compliance 
with the main principles of the Code model. Under second hypothesis, I found a 
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significant relationship between compliance with the Code and negative news 
reported over the media. Firms that have low compliance with the Code tend to 
attract higher negative news than firms that fully comply with the Code. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
the motivation for the paper, reviews prior studies and formulates my hypotheses. 
Section 3 then discusses the methodology used, followed by a discussion of the 
sample and data collection process in Section 4. I present the results of the study 
in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
5.2 Motivation, Literature Review and Hypotheses 
5.2.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
There are many studies that look into the role of media criticism on influencing 
the market and firm's behaviour. This is because media is seen as one important 
stakeholder, representing the public and potential investors to the firm and they 
can act as a monitor or 'watchdog'. Miller (2006) finds that the media fulfils this 
role by rebroadcasting information from other information intermediaries 
(analysts, auditors and lawsuits) and by undertaking original investigation and 
analysis. In general, he finds that the media covers firms and frauds that will be of 
interest to a broad set of readers and situations that are of low cost to identify and 
investigate. 
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Such coverage by the media will have an impact on share prices and the firm has 
to take notice of the publicity given to them and take corrective action if 
necessary. Tetlock (2007) quantitatively measures the interaction between the 
media comments and firms' share price and finds that high media pessimism 
predicts downward pressure on market prices followed by a reversion to 
fundamentals, and unusually high or low pessimism predicts high market trading 
volume. This finding is further confirmed by Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky & 
Macskassy (2008) who again use a quantitative measure of language for media 
content and suggest that it can capture otherwise hard-to-quantify aspects of 
firms' fundamentals, which investors quickly incorporate into stock prices. In 
particular they find that negative words used in the media can forecast low firm 
earnings. 
When such findings are taken into the context of non-compliance with the Code, 
any act of non-compliance which is in conflict with the general perception of 
appropriateness will be interpreted as having poor governance. Therefore media 
criticism on such issues can be considered as potential costs for non-compliance 
and we need to have more understanding of this relationship by looking into what 
prior studies have done. 
Whenever a firm decides to comply or not to comply with certain principles of the 
Code, there will be benefits and costs associated with it. As only 34% of the firms 
in FTSE350 in the UK fully comply with the Code, an interesting question is what 
are the potential costs for the majority of firms that do not comply with the Code? 
There are many studies that have used firm performance as a proxy for this cost 
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(Core, Guay & Rusticus, 2006; Larcker, Richardson & Tuna, 2007) but there are 
also some problems highlighted in prior studies such as endogeneity issue 
(Chidambaran, Palia & Zheng, 2006) and mixed results which has been 
highlighted in my previous chapter and other prior studies (Padgett & Shabbir, 
2005; MacNeil & Li, 2006). Therefore, the next best indirect approach to proxy 
for the potential cost would be media criticism. This is because the media is the 
only entity that can cater to various levels of interested parties and act as an 
important informational role between the firms and its shareholders (Miller, 
2006). Media is also sought after by various parties since it can playa substantial 
role in reducing the costs for collecting and evaluating information and in shaping 
the reputation of the firms (Core et aI., 2008). With its position as intermediaries 
between the firm and its shareholders, the media can therefore fulfil the demand 
for the investigative and analytical role (Miller, 2006). 
Through media criticism the firms will know whether their act of non-compliance 
will receive an approval or rejection of their policy. Severe repercussion can also 
happen if the media criticism is intense in its negativity. Kothari, Li & Short 
(2008) analyse disclosure reports by management, analysts and news reporters and 
discover that when content analysis indicates negative disclosures, it results in 
firm's increased cost of capital and return volatility. They have also found that 
favourable reports reduce the cost of capital and return volatility of the firm. 
Nevertheless, there is still a huge knowledge gap in understanding the relationship 
between non-compliance with the Code with media criticism as its potential costs 
as none of the studies in the UK have so far looked into such an effect. 
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Media criticism can become an important medium with regard to the firm's act of 
complying or not with the Code. The media can channel the voice of all 
shareholders and firms might have to take notice and respond in an appropriate 
manner in order not to cause undue concern to its potential investors and other 
interested parties. When the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2003 was 
introduced, several big firms decided not to comply with some of its 
recommendations. Barclays was the first FfSElOO firm that did not comply with 
the Section A.2.223 of the Code when they decided to appoint outgoing CEO, Matt 
Barrett as their new chairman in 2003 and there are many articles24 covering this 
issue and all expressed concern and criticism regarding such appointment. 
Hosking (2003) stated that: 
' ... the bank risked provoking a storm of protest by announcing plans to 
promote the current chief Matt Barrett to the chairman's job in breach of 
best-practice rules for the boardroom ... Promotions from chief executive to 
chairman are frowned upon under the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance' 
This article shows that a succession from CEO to chairman is seen as a major 
factor in hampering a firm's good governance. The potential cost to the business 
is realised afterwards when Moore (2003) voiced concern by shareholders by 
reporting that: 
2.1 Section A.2.2 stipulates that a chief executive should not go on to be core chairman of the same 
company. 
24 There are 27 news articles from LexisNexis database covering the issue from October 9, 2003 
until February 19, 2004 which is the day after Barclays AGM 
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'A leading investor group yesterday attacked the planned promotion to 
chairman of Barclays chief executive Matt Barrett - a day after he provoked 
a storm by calling the bank's credit cards too expensive to borrow on ... The 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) has written to incumbent chairman Sir 
Peter Middleton demanding a "full and public explanation as to why it is 
considered appropriate to deviate from best practice" by promoting Mr 
Barrett. ' 
This article shows that a group of investors25 of the firm immediately required 
explanation from the firm once they decided not to comply with an important 
principle in the Code. The firm will then have to explain their decision to the 
shareholders. Wachman (2003) reported the ongoing negotiation between the firm 
and its shareholder: 
'A fresh row has erupted over the proposed promotion of chief executive 
Matt Barrett to chairman of Barclays, contravening the Higgs code on 
corporate governance ... Leading shareholders have told Barclays non-
executive directors they are not satisfied by a letter sent to them that 
attempts to explain the decision. The letter was signed by Sir Peter 
Middleton, current chairman, who intends to hand over to Barrett next 
year. .. Said one investor: 'We have to get things right with Barclays, as it is 
the first company that has decided to ignore Higgs on this issue. If we don't, 
other firms may be encouraged to break with Higgs for flimsy reasons.' 
25 ABPs investment committee includes seYeral of Barclays' biggest shareholders. 
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These articles have managed to show that an attempt by a firm to breach an 
important principle of the Code was resisted by its shareholders. Since then, there 
are some more cases of CEO duality (Wood Group in 2005), CEO succeeding to 
become a chairman (HSBC in 2005 and Close Brothers in 2006) and the number 
of non-executive directors (Aggreko in 2006). 
In the case of the Wood Group, Sir Ian Wood's role as a chairman and CEO has 
been defended by its board of directors because: 
' ... as a result of his substantial shareholdings in the company, Sir Ian 
Wood's interests are very closely aligned with those of the company's other 
shareholders, and that his continuing to hold the combined role is in the best 
interests of the company.' (McConnell, 2005) 
This shows that the board of directors are willing to support the case of CEO 
duality if they are convinced it is in the best interests of the company. In some 
cases the shareholders themselves will give support to the act of non-compliance 
with the Code if it is in the best interests of the firm, as happened to Aggreko who 
have insufficient numbers of non-executive directors to comply with the 
requirements of the Code (Smith, 2006/6 . 
Investors raised concerns over HSBC's and Close Brothers' decisions to promote 
their CEO to become chairman and subsequently sent out a signal to others that 
they should question executives very closely before sanctioning a move by the 
26 It is worth noting that even when Aggreko received the majority of support, 22% of the 
shareholders still registered protest votes 
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chief executive to the top job (Hargreaves, 2006). HSBC acknowledged that the 
appointment is against the recommendations ofthe Code but insisted that it is 'in 
the best interests of all s hareho lders' (Goodway, 2005). 
In recent years media coverage has become more intensive as shown by the 
example of Marks & Spencers (M&S) in 2008. When its CEO, Sir Stuart Rose 
took on the position of chairman in March 2008, there were over 78 articles27 
covering the issue which is three times the coverage that Barclays record in 2003 
and the reaction from the shareholders were similar in the sense that they 
demanded explanation on the breach of the Code and the firm had to resort to 
negotiation with them. For example, Hawkes (2008) recorded a negative reaction 
from the shareholders following the announcement by M&S: 
'However, leading institutions said that the move was a clear breach of 
corporate governance best practice. The Association of British Insurers 
(ABI) demanded an explanation, and Legal & General, one of Marks & 
Spencer's biggest shareholders, rounded on the board ... Mark Burgess, the 
head of equities for Legal & General, said: "As set out in the Combined 
Code we believe strongly in the separation of the roles of chairman and 
chief executive, believing this allows a much needed balance in the 
boardroom and prevents the potentially damaging concentration of power. 
As such, we believe today's announcement from M&S is unwelcome.' 
The shareholders had serious concerns over this breach and eventually the firm 
27 These articles are from the LexisNexis database. 
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had to compromise as described by Fletcher (2008): 
'Marks & Spencer's beleaguered board has been forced to make a series of 
concessions in an attempt to pacify shareholders angered by the elevation of 
Sir Stuart Rose to executive chairman. Following a bitter two-week row 
between M&S and its institutional investors, the retailer spelt out a series of 
measures it hopes will win over investors. In a letter to the Association of 
British Insurers, M&S is understood to have said that it will: 
* put Sir Stuart up for re-election every year - a move which will allow 
shareholders to vote on his appointment later this year at the group's 
AGM; 
* look to appoint a new heavyweight non-executive who will eventually 
succeed Sir David Michaels as senior independent director; and 
* vow not to give Sir Stuart a pay rise, although outgoing chairman Lord 
Burns is still expected to pick up a pounds 450,000 pay-off' 
Certainly, firms realise that any breach of a major principle in the Code will 
have serious costs to their business and yet some of them are quite determined 
and willing to make some other concessions to their shareholders in order to 
stick with their original decision. This is certainly the case with M&S when Sir 
Stuart Rose still won a shareholder vote in the July 2008 AGM to reappoint 
him, albeit with 22% objecting, after reminding their shareholders that 
' ... appointing a new chief executive in 2008 or 2009 to replace Sir Stuart 
"was likely to be a damaging and unwelcome distraction at precisely the 
time that the business needed clear leadership to sustain its recovery and 
transformation' (BBC, 2008). 
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All the above articles discussed the case when the firms are breaching some of the 
most important principles of the Code. However, when there is non-compliance 
on other less popular requirements, the media has been silent about it. For 
example, one of the requirements in the Code is for the firm to provide terms and 
conditions of appointment of non-executive directors available for inspection 
(A.4.4). In 2006, there are 140 firms that do not comply with this requirement 
(45% of the sample) and a sample of one year period of top 10 from these firms 
(based on market capitalisation) did not yield any media reaction at a1128. Similarly 
there are 65 firms (21% of the sample) in 2006 that do not comply with the 
requirement C.3.1 (Does the audit committee state to have at least one member 
with recent and relevant financial experience?) but another sample of 10 firms 
also did not produce any media criticism29 . Other prior studies have also focused 
on non-compliance that dealt with mostly main issues such as board 
independence, setting up of audit, nomination and remuneration committees and 
the role of chairman and chief executive (Padgett & Shabbir, 2005; MacNeil & Li, 
2006). 
5.2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
Based on various articles mentioned above, it is therefore important to investigate 
the potential costs of non-compliance using media criticisms as the benchmark. 
Understanding them will help the firm correctly to make a decision regarding 
28 Using Lexis-Nexis database, the number of articles related to 'corporate governance' and firm's 
name as follow: GlaxoSmithKline (6), HBOS (35), Rio Tinto (8), National Grid Transco (9), 
Unilever (11), Xstrata (5), Reckitt Benckiser (0), Imperial Tobacco (4), M&S (34), Scottish Power 
(9). 'd' "d fi ' one 
29 Using Lexis-Nexis database with the keywords of au It comrruttee an Irm s name over 
year period starting from the date of annual report. 
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compliance with the Code and avoid potential backlash by the shareholders. So far 
none of the studies has attempted to see whether such criticisms are directed 
towards any kind of non-compliance or just a specific one. Thus, based on the 
number of newspaper articles and prior studies that I reviewed and lack of 
findings from prior studies, I propose my first hypothesis in null form as below: 
HoB: Non-compliance with the Code is not perceived as having poor governance, 
as reflected in indifferent media reaction to the incidence of non-
compliance. 
If the media does react when a firm does not comply with the Code, the next step 
is to identify which principles of the Code attract greater negative reaction. Within 
the Code, there are many requirements that can be considered not as important or 
more informative in nature30• Some of the firms decide to comply with all these 
requirements and some will only focus on the main principles of the Code. Based 
on Barclays and M&S cases and a sample of firms that do not comply with the 
less important requirements of the Code, media criticisms seem to focus on non-
compliance of main principles of the Code and less exposure is given to non-
compliance on less important requirements of the Code. However, there is no 
prior study to actually look into which principles of the Code receive greater 
media attention. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis as below 
(presented in both null and alternative forms): 
3n For example, some of the requirements asked whether the annual report identifies main 
employees of the firm (A. 1.2) and whether the number of meetings and attendance of the directors 
are disclosed (A.1.2) 
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H09: There is no relationship between compliance with the main or other 
principles of the Code and the number of negative media criticisms. 
H9: Firms that do not comply with main principles of the Code will receive 
more negative media criticisms than those that do not comply with other 
principles of the Code. 
5.3 Research Methodology 
In this section I present the regression models used in the empirical analysis and 
discuss how I measure compliance with the Code and media criticism. I then 
discuss the control variables used in the models. 
5.3.1 REGRESSION MODELS 
The first model will look into the relationship between compliance with the Code 
and the number of media criticism. The model for HoB is specified as below: 
Newsi,l = /30 + /31 COM;,1 + /32 Controls;,l + £i,l (12) 
where News is a proxy for the number of media criticisms, measured using 
number of news articles; COM is a proxy for compliance with the Code; Controls 
is an additional determinants of the number of media criticisms; E is the error term 
and i and t are firm and time subscripts respectively. 
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The second model will look into the relationship between compliance with the 
Code and the number of negative media criticism. The model for H9 is specified 
as below: 
NegNewSi" = /30 + /31 COMi,' + /32 Controlsi,t + t:i,t (13) 
where NegNews is a proxy for the number of negative media criticisms, measured 
using fraction of negative words over total number of words; COM is a proxy for 
compliance with the Code; Controls is an additional determinants of the number 
of negative media criticisms; E is the error term and i and t are firm and time 
subscripts respectively. 
5.3.2 COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE AND MEDIA CRITICISM 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, most of the previous studies rely on self-
constructed index to measure governance (Padgett & Shabbir, 2005; Arcot & 
Bruno, 2007). I have been fortunate to receive assistance from Grant Thornton 
who agreed to share their database on trends of compliance with the Code among 
FTSE 350 firms from 2003 until 2007. Therefore my measurement of compliance 
with the Code will not suffer heavily from selection bias and will also differentiate 
it from previous studies. I used measurements on media criticism based from past 
studies in order to provide comparability with them. 
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5.3.2.1 Measuring Compliance with the Code 
Previously, study on the compliance level of the Code had to rely on self-
constructed index (Padgett & Shabbir, 2005; Arcot & Bruno, 2007) and survey 
(MacNeil & Li, 2006) since such data is not available publicly in any database or 
publication. However, since 2002, Grant Thornton UK LLP has started to review 
and publish annual study on the level of compliance for FfSE 350 companies. 
Through series of discussion, they have agreed to provide me with their raw data 
for the year 2003 until 2007. Grant Thornton has their own compliance index and 
I have included their index in my study together with the amended index to 
incorporate more stringent requirements to link relationship between compliance 
with the Code and various issues studied. 
In order to measure compliance rate, I will use two levels of measurements. The 
first level is a continuous variable where percentage of compliance to the Code is 
measured using Grant Thornton questionnaire method (20 questions based on the 
principles in the Code, see Table 3.1 in Chapter Three). I decided to refine this 
index further by introducing second level of measurement because some of them 
questions posed by Grant Thornton are merely informational in nature and not 
really promoting the true objectives of the Code3!. Therefore I created another 
compliance index that consists of requirements that truly promote corporate 
governance. This index has only four questions from the original twenty questions 
from Grant Thornton index. 
31 For example. one of the questions asked by Grant Thornton is whether the terms and conditions 
of appointment of non-executive directors are available for inspection. 
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5.3.2.2 Measuring Media Criticism 
Since the GT index already identifies the number of firms that fully or partially in 
compliance with the Code, the next step is to concentrate on the firms that do not 
comply with the main principles of the Code and to search in the LexisNexis 
databases if there is any incidence of media criticism. This scope will be in all UK 
news with a one year period starting with the date of their annual report using 
multiple variation of firm's name (for example, Barc1ays Bank PLC and M&S for 
Marks & Spencer). Several keywords related to compliance or non-compliance 
with the Code will be included in the search32. The first level of measurement 
which will be used in HoB is to count the number of articles that cover any issues 
related to the firm compliance with the Code and corporate governance. The 
second level of measurement, which will be explained in detail in the next 
paragraph, is to count the number of negative and positive words in each of the 
articles and present them in terms of percentage of total words. This second level 
of measurement will then be used to test H9. 
In order to determine whether any article is deemed negative or positive, I will use 
General Inquirer, a content analysis program with H4-4 tag categories33• This 
program among its other functions can determine and calculate the number of 
negative and positive words in an article. There are many other content analysis 
programs like CATPAC, Concordance and Diction but General Inquirer is more 
commonly used when analysing accounting and financial information (Tetlock, 
32 Keywords that will be used in the search will be general terms like 'code' and 'governance' .. 
33 For further information, please go to http://www.webuse.umd.edu:9090/where the program IS 
free to use. The current system identifies about 13,000 word roots and utilizes 6,336 
disambiguation rules. 
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2007; Tetlock et aI., 2008). General Inquirer also has very large categories for 
positive words (1,915 words of positive outlook) and negative words (2,291 
words of negative outlook). However, I decided to focus primarily on the negative 
words because negative words are argued to have more impact and are more 
thoroughly processed than positive words across a wide range of contexts (Rozin 
& Royzman, 2001). Positive words are also found to produce weaker results, and 
negative words have stronger correlation when looking into a relationship with 
share returns (Tetlock, 2007). In addition, since I am looking into firm's non-
compliance with the Code, which is generally viewed as having poor 
governance34, it is reasonable to think that negative words are more suitable 
subject to look for in the articles. 
Thus, for each article, I will use General Inquirer to calculate the number of 
negative words and then divided them over total words for that article. I will then 
calculate the aggregate percentage of negative words per article that correspond to 
a specific firm's non-compliance with the principles of the Code. The same 
method was also used in Tetlock et aI. (2008) study when they were looking into 
media coverage surrounding earnings announcement. 
5.3.3 CONTROL VARIABLES FOR THE MODELS 
Both models mentioned above will be using four control variables. There is a 
possibility that only firms with certain characteristics are receiving greater 
attention from the media. Greater coverage has been made over the M&S and 
34 Among the reasons why the Code was introduced is mentioned in the Cadbury R~port (199~: 
p II): -Companies whose standards of corporate governance are high are the more likely to gam 
the confidence of investors and support for the development of their businesses' 
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Barclays, two of the most well-known brands in the UK and yet when Wood 
Group and Close Brothers decided to breach the main principle of the Code, the 
media reaction is not as hostile as those more prominent firms even when the 
shareholders do not agree with the firm's decision35 . In terms of market 
capitalisation in 2006, Barclays and M&S were £38.8 billion and £9.4 billion 
respectively compared to Wood Group and Close Brothers who were only £1.2 
billion and £1.3 billion respectively. 
Political cost theory can perhaps explain this where firms with high political 
visibility (usually measured based on the firm size) will usually attract the 
attention of external parties like the government, regulators and other shareholders 
because they are deemed to be key and important contributors to the market and 
the general public. Therefore, larger firms will employ various devices to reduce 
this political cost by being more transparent through voluntary disclosure (Deegan 
& Gordon, 1996) and resorting to stricter governance rules (Klapper & Love, 
2004). Subsequently, any breach of important governance guidance by large firms 
will be quickly highlighted by the media as we have seen in Barclays and M&S 
cases. However, even though there are many studies that looked into the 
relationship between firm size and other good governance measurements (Laing 
& Weir, 1999; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003) none of the studies have so far 
investigated whether firm size might influence the decision by the media to 
criticise their breaching of the principles in the Code. Therefore my first control 
variable will be Size which is a proxy for firm size, measured by natural log of the 
firm's market capitalisation. 
35 There are only two media articles regarding CEO duality issue in Wood Group in 2005 even 
when one of the articles mentioned a potential shareholder rebellion in the upcoming AGM. Close 
Brothers only warranted three articles covering its CEO succession to become a chairman. 
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A study on a link between good governance and firm performance has been a 
major focus in many studies but produced a variety of results and discussion 
including the causality issue. Nevertheless, most of the studies agree that good 
governance is usually associated with good performance and vice versa (Vafeas & 
Theodorou, 1998; Klapper & Love, 2004; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005; Black, Jang 
& Kim, 2006) although there are other studies that look into signalling theory 
where poor performance firm would enhance their governance to make them in 
similar appearance with the well performed firm if the cost of improving the 
governance is minimal (Cho & Kim, 2003). 
There are several studies that look into the relationship betwen firm's performance 
and media criticism (Kothari et aI., 2008; Tetlock et aI., 2008) but none so far has 
attempted to link poorly governed (as implied by non-compliance with the Code) 
firm's profitability with the media criticism. Although MacNeil & Li (2006) 
hinted that there is a link between share price performance and investors' 
tolerance of non-compliance with the Code in the sense that if the firm is 
performing better, an incidence of non-compliance might be tolerated by its 
shareholders, their focus is more on share price performance rather than media 
criticism as a proxy for potential cost. Thus, my second control variable is firm 
profitability and measured using ROA (earnings before interest and taxes over 
average total assets). ROA is the preferred measure for firm profitability because 
it is not affected by leverage, extraordinary items, and other discretionary items 
(Barber & Lyon, 1996). It also has more desirable distributional properties than 
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ROE (net income over common equity) because total assets are strictly positive, 
but equity can be zero or negative (Core et al., 2(06). 
The other two control variables are OwnDir and OwnBlock. OwnDir is a proxy for 
total shares held by executive directors over the total number of shares 
outstanding and OwnBlock is a proxy for dummy variable coded 1 if at least one 
external shareholder holds more than 10% of outstanding equity and 0 otherwise. 
These two variables are usually used by prior studies as alternative measurements 
of corporate governance. 
5.4 Sample, Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
5.4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The initial sample of firms used for this study is based on the FfSE 350 UK firms 
(excluding financial and utility firms) for each year from 2003 until 2007. These 
firms were selected because they were in the Grant Thornton Annual FfSE 350 
Corporate Governance Review (2004 - 2007) to which Grant Thornton UK LLP 
has agreed to provide their raw data to me to analyse further for the purpose of 
this study. 
From the initial set of sample from Grant Thornton, several firms were omitted for 
the reasons such as firms that have been undergoing acquisition, merger, demerger 
and being delisted from the stock exchange as their data is no longer available in 
the database. Since the number of firms in the sample has been slightly changed, I 
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have adjusted the compliance rate to the Code which has been reported earlier by 
Grant Thornton using their original sample. 
Then, for each corresponding year (2003 to 2(07), I choose 20 firms that have the 
highest rate and 20 firms that have the lowest rate of compliance according to the 
measurements of both levels of compliance. I can only choose 20 firms for each 
set of sample because the original sample only has 79 firms up to 247 for each 
year (Please refer to Table 3.3 in Chapter Three). Therefore the final sample for 
each model will be 100 firms each36 . 
5.4.2 DATA 
Compliance with the Code data is obtained from the Grant Thornton Annual 
FfSE 350 Corporate Governance Review raw data for each year from 2003 until 
2007. This raw data consists of survey information on each individual firm in the 
FfSE 350. The survey questions are driven directly from the Code provisions and 
Turnbull guidance and are created to reflect the 'best practice' as perceived by the 
Code. The survey is completed by reading the hard copies of each firm's annual 
report and accounts, focusing on the front half of the report (i.e. not the accounts) 
including the sections; Business Review, Corporate Responsibility, Corporate 
Governance and Remuneration Report. 
The number of news item related to FfSE 350 firms are obtained from 
LexisNexis database. All other financial data are obtained from Datastream and 
36 For example, 20 firms for five years for high compliance rate model. 
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FAME database. Shareholders ownership structure is obtained from Waterlow 
Stock Exchange Yearbook. This data is hand collected from the ownership 
structure report section of the corresponding firm's published annual report and 
accounts. Management share ownership data is obtained from Manifest database. 
5.4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for 
HoB. Panel A of Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used under 
high rate of first level of compliance model. Mean for News is 0.94 with a 
standard deviation of 1.74. Mean for Comp20 is 0.93 with a standard deviation of 
0.07. Panel B of Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used under 
high rate of second level of compliance model. Mean for News is 0.92 with a 
standard deviation of 1.76. Mean for Comp4 is 0.98 with a standard deviation of 
0.07. Panel C of Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used under 
low rate of first level of compliance model. Mean for News is 0.71 with a standard 
deviation of 1.42. Mean for Comp20 is 0.59 with a standard deviation of 0.17. 
Panel D of Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used under high 
rate of second level of compliance model. Mean for News is 0.61 with a standard 
deviation of 1.45. Mean for Comp4 is 0.42 with a standard deviation of 0.20. It 
seems that there is less news coverage for firms that do not comply with the Code 
than firms that do comply with the Code. This could mean that firms that fully 
comply with the Code took extra efforts in promoting and announcing to the 
potential stakeholders that they are at least doing something to improve 
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governance within the firm. The final sample is less than 100 each because I had 
to remove one, two or three firms from each of the models due to extreme outliers. 
Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for H9. 
Panel A of Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used under high 
rate of first level of compliance model. Mean for NegNews is 0.41 with a standard 
deviation of 0.97. Mean for Comp20 is 0.93 with a standard deviation of 0.07. 
Panel B of Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used under high 
rate of second level of compliance model. Mean for NegNews is 0.38 with a 
standard deviation of 0.98. Mean for Comp4 is 0.98 with a standard deviation of 
0.07. Panel C of Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used under 
low rate of first level of compliance model. Mean for NegNews is 0.53 with a 
standard deviation of 1.18. Mean for Comp20 is 0.59 with a standard deviation of 
0.17. Panel D of Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for sample used under 
high rate of second level of compliance model. Mean for NegNews is 0.36 with a 
standard deviation of 1.10. Mean for Comp4 is 0.42 with a standard deviation of 
0.20. 
In addition of looking into the skewness of the data, Q-Q plots have been 
employed to check the deviations of the data from the normal distribution. Q-Q 
plots for HoB and H9 are presented in the Appendix K and L respectively. 
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5.5 Analysis 
This section examines the relation between compliance with the Code and media 
criticism. I report the main results in the next section. 
5.5.1 RESULTS 
Table 5.3 reports coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for OLS 
regression on HoB. I could not find any significant relationship between 
compliance with the Code and number of news item reported using both the 
Comp20 and Comp4 compliance variables and under both set of compliance rate. 
However, all four models show significant positive relationship between number 
of news item reported and firm size. This conforms to the political cost theory that 
firms with high political visibility (in this case based on its size) will attracts more 
attention by the media when dealing with transparency and governance. I also 
discover a significant negative relationship between the number of news item 
reported and firm performance under both high and low rate of compliance with 
the main principles (Comp4) of the Code model. It seems that it does not matter if 
the firm is complying with the main principles within the Code or not, the media 
will still respond with higher interest to any events related to the underperforming 
of the firm. Another finding is a significant positive relationship between the 
number of news reported and OwnDir variable under low rate of compliance with 
the Comp20 as its governance variable. 
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Coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for OLS regression on H9 are 
presented in Table 5.4. Under the sample of firms with high compliance rate, I 
could not find any significant relationship between negative news and firms that 
fully comply with the Code. However, under the sample of firms with low 
compliance rate, I found a significant negative relationship between negative news 
and compliance with the Code. This means that firms that do not comply with the 
Code will attract higher negative media reaction than firms that fully comply with 
the Code. Firms size also play significant role in generating number of negative 
news. Basically, the bigger the firm is, the higher negative news it will attract if it 
does not fully comply with the Code. The summary table for outcomes for all 
hypotheses is presented in Table 5.5. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the relationship between compliance with the Code and 
media criticism. Earlier studies have investigated media criticism relation with 
firm performance and various governance mechanisms but none has so far tried to 
look into the link with compliance with the Code. My analysis is motivated by the 
theoretical perspective such as political cost theory where firms with high political 
visibility will usually attract the attention of external parties such as media. As 
such, any act of non-compliance with the Code will be interpreted as having poor 
governance. Therefore media criticism on such issues can be considered as 
potential costs for non-compliance and we need to have more understanding of 
this relationship by looking into different levels of compliance with the Code and 
media criticism. In that sense this chapter adds to current literature by providing a 
143 
UK perspective on the measurements of corporate governance and its relationship 
with media criticism. 
Two hypotheses and eight related models were tested. I could not find any 
significant relationship between compliance with the Code and number of news 
reported using both levels of compliance variables and level of compliance rate. 
However, I do found a significant positive relationship between number of news 
item reported and firm size under both high and low rate of compliance with the 
Code models. I also found a significant negative relationship between number of 
news item reported and firm performance under high rate of compliance with the 
main principles of the Code model. I found a significant negative relationship 
between negative news and compliance with the Code. Firms that have low 
compliance rate with the Code attract higher negative news than firms that fully 
comply with the Code. Firm size also have a significant positive relationship with 
negative news. 
Limitations of the analysis are as follows. Since this could be the first attempt for 
the UK study to look into the relationship between compliance with the Code and 
media criticism, I might have overlooked a better measurements and more 
accurate models to capture the underlying link between governance and media. By 
induding more alternative measurements and models I could get better and more 
comprehensive results which could explain in greater clarity of such relationship. 
For examples, I could introduce more keywords criteria to define governance or 
issues related to it such as 'CEO Duality' or 'board independence' but having a 
small set of firm sample prevent me from doing that. Thus the next step might be 
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to include more firms into the sample and not just FTSE 350 firms. Future 
research could employ this alternative models and measurements to better capture 
the relationship between media criticism and compliance with the Code. 
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TABLES.1 
Descriptive Statistics for HrJ3 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for high rate of compliance and Comp20 model 
N min max mean stdev skew kurt 
News 99 0 9 0.94 1.74 2.78 8.37 
Comp20 99 0.75 1 0.93 0.07 -1.33 1.19 
Size 99 19.36 23.77 21.31 1.11 0.40 -0.44 
OwnDir 99 0 0.56 0.02 0.10 4.59 20.17 
OwnBlock 99 0 1 0.51 0.50 -0.02 -2.04 
ROA 99 -0.99 1.32 0.21 0.44 -0.19 0.67 
Panel B: Descnptlve statIstIcs for high rate of compliance and Comp4 model 
N min max mean stdev skew kurt 
News 99 0 9 0.92 1.76 2.75 8.02 
Comp4 99 0.75 1 0.98 0.07 -3.12 7.92 
Size 99 19.36 23.77 21.30 1.11 0.40 -0.58 
OwnDir 99 0 0.56 0.02 0.09 4.67 22.47 
OwnB10 ck 99 0 1 0.55 0.50 -0.19 -2.01 
ROA 99 -0.83 1.32 0.23 0.37 0.02 0.57 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for low rate of compliance and Comp20 model 
N min max mean stdev skew kurt 
News 97 0 9 0.71 1.42 3.31 13.72 
Comp20 97 0.15 0.90 0.59 0.17 -0.31 -0.48 
Size 97 19.46 22.60 20.49 0.81 0.90 -0.12 
OwnDir 97 0 0.88 0.09 0.19 2.55 6.14 
OwnB10 ck 97 0 1 0.59 0.49 -0.36 -1.91 
ROA 97 -0.89 1.23 0.28 0.43 -0.32 0.78 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for low rate of comphance and Comp4 model 
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N min max mean stdev skew kurt 
News 98 0 9 0.61 1.45 3.48 14.10 
Comp4 98 0 0.75 0.42 0.20 0.09 -0.57 
Size 98 19.04 23.56 20.45 0.87 1.29 1.60 
OwnDir 98 0 0.80 0.09 0.19 2.22 3.93 
OwnBlock 98 0 1 0.51 0.50 -0.04 -2.04 
ROA 98 -0.89 1.89 0.37 0.45 0.02 1.48 
This table presents the descnphve statistIcs for HoB models. Panel A presents the 
statistics for all the variables used in high rate of compliance and Comp20 model, 
Panel B presents the statistics for all the variables used in high rate of compliance 
and Comp4 model, Panel C presents the statistics for all the variables used in low 
rate of compliance and Comp20 model and Panel D presents the statistics for all 
the variables used in low rate of compliance and Comp4 model. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics for H9 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for high rate of compliance and Comp20 model 
N min max mean stdev skew kurt 
NegNews 99 0 4.41 0.41 0.97 2.43 5.36 
Comp20 99 0.75 1 0.93 0.07 -1.33 1.19 
Size 99 19.36 23.77 21.31 1.11 0.40 -0.44 
OwnDir 99 0 0.56 0.02 0.10 4.59 20.17 
OwnBlock 99 0 1 0.51 0.50 -0.02 -2.04 
ROA 99 -0.99 1.32 0.21 0.44 -0.19 0.67 
Panel B: Descnptive statistics for low rate of complIance and Comp4 model 
N min max mean stdev skew kurt 
NegNews 99 0 4.41 0.38 0.98 2.56 5.75 
Comp4 99 0.75 1 0.98 0.07 -3.12 7.92 
Size 99 19.36 23.77 21.30 1.11 0.40 -0.58 
OwnDir 99 0 0.56 0.02 0.09 4.67 22.47 
OwnBlock 99 0 1 0.55 0.50 -0.19 -2.01 
ROA 99 -0.83 1.32 0.23 0.37 0.02 0.57 
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics for high rate of compliance and Comp20 model 
N min max mean stdev skew kurt 
NegNews 97 0 4.03 0.53 1.18 2.02 2.63 
Comp20 97 0.15 0.9 0.59 0.17 -0.31 -0.48 
Size 97 19.46 22.60 20.49 0.81 0.90 -0.12 
OwnDir 97 0 0.88 0.09 0.19 2.55 6.14 
OwnB10 ck 97 0 1 0.59 0.49 -0.36 -1.91 
ROA 97 -0.89 1.23 0.28 0.43 -0.32 0.78 
Panel D: DescnptIve statIstics for low rate of compliance and Comp4 model 
N min max mean stdev Skew kurt 
NegNews 98 0 4.60 0.36 1.10 2.86 6.69 
Comp4 98 0 0.75 0.42 0.20 0.09 -0.57 
Size 98 19.04 23.56 20.45 0.87 1.29 1.60 
OwnDir 98 0 0.80 0.09 0.19 2.22 3.93 
OwnB10 ck 98 0 1 0.51 0.50 -0.04 -2.04 
ROA 98 -0.89 1.89 0.37 0.45 0.02 1.48 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for H9 models. Panel A presents the 
statistics for all the variables used in high rate of compliance and Comp20 model, 
Panel B presents the statistics for all the variables used in high rate of compliance 
and Comp4 model, Panel C presents the statistics for all the variables used in low 
rate of compliance and Comp20 model and Panel D presents the statistics for all 
the variables used in low rate of compliance and Comp4 model. 
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TABLE 5.3 
OLS Regression Results for Ho8 
Independent variables HighComp20 HighComp4 LowComp20 LowComp4 
est. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co-eff. F-value p-value 
Intercept -13.080 -2.820 0.006 -4.631 -1.106 0.272 -7.942 -2.097 0.039 -5.750 -1.531 0.129 
Y2003 0.615 0.805 0.423 0.406 0.586 0.560 -0.355 -.606 0.546 
Y2004 -0.508 -0.925 0.358 -0.283 -0.447 0.656 -0.383 -0.484 0.629 -0.564 -.845 0.401 
Y2005 -0.399 -0.771 0.443 -0.076 -0.120 0.905 -0.253 -0.508 0.613 0.424 .827 0.410 
Y2006 0.354 0.572 0.569 0.372 0.805 0.423 0.285 .583 0.561 
Y2007 -1.286 -2.458 0.016 -0.299 -0.449 0.654 
Size 0.454 2.865 0.005 0.404 2.390 0.019 0.461 2.660 0.009 0.365 1.986 0.050 
OwnDir -1.245 -0.731 0.467 -1.846 -0.896 0.373 1.810 2.392 0.019 0.331 0.391 0.697 
OwnB/ock -0.604 -1.755 0.083 -0.482 -1.332 0.186 -0.118 -0.420 0.675 -0.100 -0.329 0.741 
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ROA -0.459 -1.191 0.237 -0.951 -1. 939 0.056 -0.448 -1.345 0.182 -0.947 -2.787 0.007 
Compliance variables 5.431 1.402 0.165 -2.514 -0.799 0.426 -1.340 -0.834 0.407 -1.644 -1.389 0.168 
RSquare 0.2303 0.1663 0.2416 0.1699 
Adjusted R Square 0.1525 0.0820 0.1632 0.0850 
This table presents the OLS regression results for H8 with its estimated co-efficients and its p values. Column HighComp20 is for 
model that uses a sample of high compliance rate firms and Comp20 as its governance variable. Column HighComp4 is for model that 
uses a sample of high compliance rate firms and Comp4 as its governance variable. Column LowComp20 is for model that uses a 
sample of low compliance rate firms and Comp20 as its governance variable. Column LowComp4 is for model that uses a sample of 
low compliance rate firms and Comp4 as its governance variable. 
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TABLE 5.4 
OLS Regression Results for H9 
Independent variables HighComp20 HighComp4 LowComp20 LowComp4 
est. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co-eff. F-value p-value est. co-eff. F-value p-value 
Intercept -4.785 -1.772 0.080 -0.079 -0.032 0.974 -3.766 -1.132 0.261 -3.168 -1.162 0.248 
Y2003 -0.280 -0.630 0.530 -0.604 -0.992 0.324 -1.128 -2.647 0.010 
Y2004 -0.517 -1.617 0.109 0.036 0.098 0.922 -1.059 -1.523 0.131 -1.119 -2.306 0.023 
Y2()()5 
-0.430 -1.426 0.157 0.006 0.016 0.988 -0.510 -1.166 0.247 -0.513 -1.376 0.172 
Y2006 0.572 1.590 0.115 -0.056 -0.137 0.892 0.124 0.349 0.728 
Y2()m 
-0.744 -2.444 0.017 -0.010 -0.025 0.980 
Size 0.230 2.488 0.015 0.079 0.807 0.422 0.317 2.079 0.041 0.246 1.841 0.069 
OwnDir -1.054 -1.063 0.291 -0.442 -0.369 0.713 0.571 0.859 0.393 0.213 0.346 0.731 
OwnB/ock -0.234 -1.165 0.247 -0.233 -1.111 0.270 0.160 0.644 0.521 0.294 1.339 0.184 
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ROA -0.128 -0.571 0.569 -0.263 -0.922 0.359 -0.125 -0.428 0.670 -0.301 -1.220 0.226 
Compliance variables 0.925 0.410 0.683 -1.169 -0.640 0.524 -3.153 -2.232 0.028 -2.456 -2.858 0.005 
R Square 0.1682 0.0926 0.1431 0.2321 
Adjusted R Square 0.0840 0.0008 0.0544 0.1536 
This table presents the OLS regression results for H9 with its estimated co-efficients and its p values. Column HighComp20 is for 
model that uses a sample of high compliance rate firms and Comp20 as its governance variable. Column HighComp4 is for model that 
uses a sample of high compliance rate firms and Comp4 as its governance variable. Column LowComp20 is for model that uses a 
sample oflow compliance rate firms and Comp20 as its governance variable. Column LowComp4 is for model that uses a sample of 
low compliance rate firms and Comp4 as its governance variable. 
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TABLE 5.5 
Summary of outcomes for all hypotheses 
Hypothesis Hypotheses Outcomes 
No. 
HoB Non -compliance with the Code is not Fail to reject HoB 
perceived as having poor governance, as 
reflected in indifferent media reaction to 
the incidence of non-compliance. 
H9 Firms that do not comply with main Partly fail to reject Ho9, 
principles of the Code will receive more firms with low 
negative media criticisms than those that compliance receive 
do not comply with other principles of the more negative media 
Code. criticisms 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
Several prior independent studies have found that less than half of FfSE 350 
firms do not fully comply with the Code. This is in contrast with the desire of the 
FRC to see all the firms having high governance standards d~e to strings of 
financial scandals in the UK and the rest of the world. The fact that by having 
good governance practise will improve the firm's relationship with its investors 
and shareholders make it more puzzling on why firms are reluctant to fully 
comply with the Code. 
In term of studying the Code itself, none of the prior studies, especially in the UK, 
have looked beyond its relationship with firm performance. There are lots of 
studies in the US and the UK that have looked into various measurements of 
governance like board structure, shareholders ownership and CEO ownership 
among others, even constructing their own governance index, to find their effects 
on various managerial and shareholders issues but none has so far tried to use the 
principles of the Code as their main focal point. 
Therefore this study intends to investigate what makes the firms that fully comply 
with the Code differ from those that do not in term of safeguarding the welfare of 
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stakeholders and controlling managers' behaviour, what set of principles within 
the Code matter most to the shareholders, and what are the potential costs to the 
firms if they do not fully comply with the Code. 
The aim of this study as identified in Chapter Three is to look into relationships 
between compliance with the Code and issues related to managerial decision 
making such as diversification, CEO compensation and accounting quality. With 
the available data of FfSE 350 firms between 2003 and 2007 provided by Grant 
Thornton, I present a descriptive analysis of the relationship between compliance 
with the Code and those issues. I observe a significant positive relationship 
between the firms who claim full compliance with the Code and the level of CEO 
compensation, which offers alternative explanation to findings by previous 
studies. I also found no evidence to suggest any relationship between firms that 
fully comply with the Code and level of diversification and timeliness of earnings. 
My second study, presented in Chapter Four examines relationships between 
compliance with the Code and issues related to welfare of shareholders such as 
disclosure quality, CEO turnover, compensation disclosure quality and firm 
performance. I found that firms that comply with the crucial principles in the 
Code have lower analyst bias and larger analyst following. I also found that there 
is no relationship between compliance with the Code and CEO turnover. There is 
some evidence of compliance with the Code which affects compensation 
disclosure quality. There is also some evidence that firms are trying to mask their 
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underperformance by claiming full compliance with the Code in their annual 
report. 
Chapter Five presents my third study which examines media criticism as a 
potential cost for firms that decide not to fully comply with the Code. I do not find 
any relationship between compliance rate of the Code and number of news related 
to it. However I found that firms that have low rate of compliance with the Code 
will attract higher negative news than firms that fully comply with the Code. 
Firms' size also plays important factor in attracting news coverage on the firms. 
Results of this study have multiple implications. As suggested by findings from 
Chapter Three to Five, there are several characteristic differences between firms 
that fully comply with the Code and firms that do not comply. The next step is to 
determine whether such differences really influence potential investors on the 
decision whether to invest in these firms or not. Is it enough for firms that have 
lower analyst bias and higher analyst following to generate interest from the 
potential investors? Will higher CEO compensation have any effect on the 
shareholders assessment on the firms or firm performance is the only thing worth 
to worry about? Will negative news on firm's non compliance with the main 
principles of the Code be enough to persuade the firms to increase their 
governance? Answers to these questions will shed light on why the majority of the 
firms are still not fully compliant with the Code. Therein lays a need for 
regulatory boards to continuously assess and update the principles embedded in 
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the Code so as to remain relevant and important in improving governance for UK 
firms. 
6.2 Contributions and Limitations 
My thesis contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, I 
extend existing research on corporate governance by looking into the importance 
of complying with the Code for UK firms. This is crucial because unlike in the US 
where firms are regulated by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, firms in the UK have 
an option whether to voluntarily comply with the Code or not. Therefore if the 
majority of firms decided not to comply with the Code, this will paint a picture 
that firms are not really learning from various financial scandals happening all 
over the world or they understand that investors and shareholders are looking far 
beyond following several recommendations outlined by the regulatory board. 
Second, through my analysis in Chapter Three until Chapter Five, I provide 
additional and more recent evidence on the relationship between compliance with 
the Code and various issues related to managerial decision making, welfare of 
shareholders and media criticism. My study also contributes in term of providing 
several alternatives for measurements of corporate governance based on the set of 
principles outlined in the Code. None of the prior studies that used their own 
index of governance based their measurements on entire principles of the Code. 
Grant Thornton did focus their measurements entirely on the principles of the 
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Code but they suffer from including governance criteria that might not be so 
important and crucial to investors and shareholders. My study refined these 
governance measurements further by only including the most important and 
relevant principles and constructing them based on issues studied. For example, if 
I want to look into CEO compensation, I would include principles that dealt with 
Remuneration Committee and will not include those principles in the governance 
measurements if I want to analyse diversification issue. The use of refined 
measurements as provided by Grant Thornton and my own adjusted index result 
in more significant evidence in some of the results on issues like disclosure 
quality, CEO compensation, compensation disclosure quality and media criticism. 
Key limitations of my work are as follows. First, my study uses a sample of FTSE 
350 firms from 2003 until 2007. Due to various merging, delisting and takeover 
activities among others, including the missing data, the final sample can be 
smaller than expected and might limit the generalisation that I made. Future 
research could expand this sample by expanding the list of firms to include more 
than 350 firms for each year. Second, various changes based on other prior studies 
could be incorporated on the models, proxies and indices used in this study. There 
is still more room for improvement and improvisation by including more 
alternative research design by other and recent studies. In addition I have not 
tested for a possible heteroscedasticity problem where the assumption that the 
error term has a constant variance is not properly tested. There are several tests 
that can be conducted to test the presence of heteroscedasticity, such as White test 
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and Breusch-Pagan test. Also a residual plot can be used to visualise a possible 
occurrence. Nevertheless, unequal error variance is only worth correcting when 
the problem is severe (Fox, 1997) and heteroscedasticity has never been a reason 
to throw out an otherwise good model (Mankiw, 1990). Third, there still exists 
ambiguity when it comes to defining governance, or in this case, identifying 
which principles of the Code constitutes good governance. It was concluded that 
studying each and everyone of the principles in the Code and incorporating them 
into the governance measurements will give a better and more refined analysis on 
the issues of corporate governance. Also, greater understanding will be achieved 
by customising the measurements according to the specific area studied and not 
standardising the measurements across various accounting and finance issues. 
However, more works needs to be done here and future research could help to 
produce a better governance measures involving the principles of the Code to be 
used especially in the UK study. 
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